Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? Limitations on Attorneys\u27 Fee in Criminal Cases by Chin, Gabriel J & Wells, Scott C
Boston College Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 1 Number 1 Article 1
12-1-2000
Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable
Price? Limitations on Attorneys' Fee in Criminal
Cases
Gabriel J. Chin
Scott C. Wells
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gabriel J. Chin and Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? Limitations
on Attorneys' Fee in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C.L. Rev. 1 (2000), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/
vol41/iss1/1
CAN A REASONABLE DOUBT HAVE AN
UNREASONABLE PRICE? LIMITATIONS ON
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES
GABRIEL J. CHIN*
SCOTT C. WELLS'*
Abstract: The disciplinary rules of every state prohibit attorneys
from charging "unreasonable" fees. These provisions, however; are
virtually never enforced; virtually all instances where the rules are
invoked involve independent forms of dishonesty or misconduct. The
only two cases in which attorneys have been disciplined solely based
on the size of the fee involved "blue-chip" civil attorneys who repre-
sented working-class defendants in criminal matters. In both cases,
the rationale for discipline was questionable; the clients were com-
pletely exonerated of criminal charges and the fees would have been
unexceptional in elite civil practice. These disciplinary prosecutions
were particularly doubtful because the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice prohibits the government from limiting the amount
of money criminal defendants can pay their lawyers.
The reasonable fee rules are either unenforced or questionably en-
forced because they are not designed to limit lawyer's  fees or incomes
per se, but to ensure that lawyers do not take advantage of clients,
and that clients understand the nature of the legal services they are
buying. The mismatch between the purpose of the rules and their
language should be remedied by making clear that lawyers are obli-
gated to talk with their clients about their legal options and offer
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some estimate of what they might cost. But fees negotiated after ap-
propriate disclosure should not subject an attorney to discipline.
INTRODUCTION
For as long as lawyers have been regulated, the law has prohib-
ited them from charging clients "unreasonable" fees. The restriction
against charging unreasonable fees is usually understood to mean that
a lawyer can be disciplined for charging a client too much money, not
that the lawyer lied, cheated or stole (wrongdoing covered by other
rules), but simply that the bill was too high under the circumstances.
Although complaints about fees are a major cause of client dissatisfac-
tion, the reasonable fee rules have gone almost entirely unenforced.
Lawyers are frequently sanctioned for procedural irregularities in bill-
ing, but it is not clear that any civil lawyer has ever been sanctioned
simply for charging an excessive fee.
Only two published cases involve a lawyer disciplined solely for
charging excessive fees; both involve lawyers representing criminal
defendants.' The cases are remarkable simply because of their rarity
and because the lawyers involved seemed unlikely candidates for pun-
ishment. One lawyer, Laurence S. Fordham, had been an editor of the
Harvard Law Review, a law clerk for the United States Supreme Court,
the managing partner of a leading Boston law firm and was a member
of the Harvard Law School faculty. The other, Luis Kutner, had been a
faculty member at Yale Law School, learned criminal practice at the
foot of Clarence Darrow, used his skills to achieve the release of 1000
criminal defendants and political prisoners during his career, was re-
sponsible for innovations in the legal system such as the living will,
and helped establish Amnesty International. Both clients involved
were completely exonerated of all criminal charges. In each case, it
seems that the lawyer's true offense was doing white-collar-style work
for blue-collar clients—and charging for it.
The reasonable fee limitation has been unenforced or enforced
perversely because the substance of the rule is not connected to the
purpose behind it. The justification for regulating fees is not that law-
yers should make modest incomes or that clients should be protected
from their own improvidence. Instead, the purpose of regulation is to
prevent lawyers from taking advantage of client ignorance about the
market for legal services and about the appropriateness of particular
I See Wilt notes 130-210 and accompanying text.
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legal strategies. At present, the rules do not accomplish this well, re-
quiring only very limited discussion about the fees clients will be re-
quired to pay. This Article proposes that the purpose behind the rule
can be achieved directly; by eliminating the reasonable fee rule and
replacing it with a requirement, which does not now exist, that lawyers
provide their clients with specific information about what they are
likely to be charged at the beginning of the representation.
As Part I explains, a common law limitation on "unconscionable"
attorneys' fees was replaced in 1969 by the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility's rule against "clearly excessive" fees. The Model
Code was supplanted in 1983 by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, which said that lawyers could not charge "unreasonable" fees. 2
Notwithstanding decades of regulation, although lawyers are fre-
quently disciplined for improprieties in connection with fees, such as
misleading a client about how much a matter will cost, doing unnec-
essary work or lying about work performed, the authors have found
no clear evidence that even one civil lawyer has ever been disciplined
simply for charging a fee which was too highs The only lawyers con-
victed of charging excessive fees have been representing clients in "re-
tail" criminal matters—street crimes or driving offenses where both
the going rates and perceived prestige of the practice areas are mod-
est. 4
Part I suggests that it should not be surprising that civil attorneys
are never disciplined (and criminal attorneys are almost never disci-
plined) simply because their fees are too high. In several ways, the
current law regarding attorneys' fees is unhelpful. Each succeeding
regime of regulation changed the language which previously had
been used to express the idea that attorneys may not charge unrea-
sonable fees, yet none of them explained whether the new term was
meant to establish a new standard for reasonableness of fees. 5 Thus,
lawyers and disciplinary authorities are left to wonder just how exces-
sive or unreasonable a fee must be before it is prohibited and subject
to disciplinary action. Perhaps more fundamentally; the test employed
by the ABA codes to measure reasonableness is so vague that it is vir-
tually useless. The test invokes no fewer than eight multi-part fac-
tors—and the list is expressly non-exclusive. Accordingly, on almost
any given set of facts, application of the factors to a fee could sustain a
2 See infra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 130-272 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
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reasonable argument that the fee is justified and a plausible argument
could also be made that the fee should have been different.6
Additionally, Part I suggests that the rules are unsatisfactory not
just because they are loosely drafted or imprecise, but because they
are not directly connected to the real harm they are designed to pre-
vent. 7 The rules are not designed to impose some upper limit on the
amount a skilled and energetic lawyer can earn; lawyers who earn six,
seven or eight-figure incomes through zealous advocacy within the
bounds of the law are honored, not disciplined.8 The reasonable fee
rules are not even aimed at the size of fees in individual matters as
such. Instead, the rules are intended to promote fairness to the client
in setting fees and billing. They do so, however, in an indirect and
imperfect manner; nowhere do the rules require lawyers to consult
with clients to ensure that clients understand the financial implica-
tions of fee arrangements.
Part II describes the harm caused by the disconnection between
the purpose and text of the rule. It is true that the purpose of the rule
is to regulate the procedure by which the fees are set. As such, the
rule is generally invoked not because the fee is too high, but because
it is unfairly set. Even so, as now constituted, the rule creates two seri-
ous problems. One problem is that it leads to underenforcement of
the rule, or, at least, underachievement of the purpose of the rule,
because it does not give clear direction to the lawyers affected and the
authorities who must enforce it about the principle at stake. There is a
substantial gap between something approaching comprehensive dis-
closure, and the kind of dishonesty and overreaching which result in
discipline. Left unprotected are clients who are 'surprised by the
amount of the fees, and understandably angry at lawyeis who cannot
be disciplined because they acted in good faith and did not violate
any rule .°
6 See infra notes 74-99 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brigid McMenamin, The Best-Paid Lawyers, FORBES, Nov. 6, 1995, at 145; John
E. Morris, The British Are Gaining, Am. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 14 (listing top 25 firms by annual
profits per partner, ranging from $2.2 million to $780,000); see also Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-
Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205,
219 (1999) ("Financial success has become the dominant value for many lawyers.... Pre-
occupation with profit is most intense in some of the most respected law firms in the
United States."); Judith L. Mame, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An Impossible
Dream?, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 798 (1992) (noting, but criticizing, "the current view which
typically measures success by income").
9 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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Another problem created by the imprecision of the rule is that it
has lead to unwarranted disciplinary prosecutions in a context which
is likely to reduce client access to counsel. Part II examines the excep-
tional disciplinary cases which imposed liability solely on the basis of
the excessive amount of the fee." These cases are controversial, noto-
rious and unjustifiable in result. First, given the elasticity of the stan-
dards used for determining a reasonable fee, there is a strong argu-
ment that the fees were reasonable under the eight-part test." For
example, while the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disci-
plined an attorney for charging $50,000 in a "routine" drunk driving
case, that attorney was an experienced, expert litigator with a national
reputation. Through diligence and ability, he won an acquittal for his
client in the face of a very strong government case. There, he per-
suaded the trial court to suppress an incriminating Breathalyzer test
using a novel legal argument.
Enforcement of the reasonable fee rules in criminal cases will
hurt clients, not help them. Because the court held that a client could
not consent to pay a fee that a tribunal later might determine was un-
reasonable, clients are no longer free to choose expert, expensive
representation in subject matter areas with relatively low "going rates."
Part II suggests that the object lessons of these cases, if heeded, will
have unfortunate consequences for clients seeking representation.
The cases in which lawyers were convicted of charging unreasonably
high fees were criminal cases of a kind that a working-or middle-class
person might face. Fee restrictions in relatively low prestige practice
areas will discourage lawyers with other career options from entering
non-white-collar criminal defense. Moreover, under the current rule,
a lawyer is required to turn down an engagement involving an "unrea-
sonable" fee, even if the client, after being fully informed, still ur-
gently wants the lawyer's services. Therefore, in two ways, the discipli-
nary prosecutions may act to deprive people of ordinary means of the
ability to hire counsel of choice. 12
Part III offers another reason why the cases disciplining criminal
defense attorneys for charging excessive fees were wrongly decided—
they violate the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution."
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions. In recent years, this clause has been examined to de-
10 See infra notes 131-272 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 217-72 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 273-317 and accompanying text.
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termine the extent that it guarantees indigents free counsel." The
original purpose of the clause, however, was to establish the right of
persons to hire their own counsel, precisely the right that fee restric-
tions impair. 15 The right to counsel of choice is not unlimited; courts
have held that a defendant has no right to insist on unlicensed coun-
sel or counsel with a conflict of interest. 16 Nevertheless, the govern-
ment has no legitimate interest in preventing client access to lawyers
simply because they are skilled enough to command high rates or
committed enough to work many hours in their clients' defense.
Part IV concludes that the remedy for the mismatch between the
purpose of the rule and its language is for the ABA and the states to
adopt a rule requiriUg counsel to offer clients information about
fees. 17 This remedy will promote the fair treatment of clients, by re-
quiring that they receive relevant information about the fees they will
be charged, which the rule does not currently require. It will also
avoid the problem of depriving them of the opportunity to retain
counsel of their choice.
I. ETHICAL LIMITATIONS ON ATTORNEYS' FEES
In express terms, the ethical rules of every state prohibit accept-
ing an unreasonable or excessive fee. Yet no definitive evidence has
been found that any civil lawyer has ever been disciplined exclusively
for charging a fee the court deemed excessive, in the absence of some
other form of misconduct. 18 Thus, Professor Charles Wolfram has
noted that "disciplinary cases resulting in findings of impermissible
fees have most often dealt with the process by which the offending
14 See info notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
15 See info notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 282-87 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 318-34 and accompanying text.
15 Given the "thitindreds, if not thousands, of decisions from disciplinary panels and
courts" dealing with excessive fees, there may be some such cases out there, but the
authors could find none. LAwvirits MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA)
§ 41:314 (1994) [hereinafter LAWYERS MANUAL]; see, e.g., Dale R. Agthe, Annotation, Attor-
neys Charging Excessive Fee as Ground for Disciplinary Action, 11 A.L.R.4th 133 (1981) (citing
hundreds of cases). Some cases, such as Florida Bar v. Moriber; 314 So. 2d 145, 149 (Fla.
1975), state in dicta that an attorney can be disciplined for charging an excessive fee, even
in absence of fraud or dishonesty, when'some sort of affirmative misconduct is involved.
Other cases offer too few details to state definitively whether they impose discipline based
solely on the size of the fee. See, e.g., In re Isaacs, 541 N.Y.S.2d 60 (App. Div. 1989); Private
Reprimand No. PR-87-14, 5 Mass. Att'y Disc. Rep. 501, 502 (1987); In re Discipline of an
Att'y, 2 Mass. Att'y Disc. Rep. 115, 117 (1980).
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lawyer set the fee." 1 ° Professors Deborah Rhode, Geoffrey Hazard and
William Hodes have also observed that discipline for charging exces-
sive fees is rare.20 Decisions cited in the relevant American Jurisprudence
entry seem typical of this body of law. This treatise asserts that "[a] ii
attorney may be subject to discipline for charging excessive fees for
legal services."21
 The footnote and pocket part cite two dozen cases,
but with a single exception, 22
 the cases do not really support the
proposition." The cases cited involve illegal fees; 24 attempts to col-
lect more than agreed; 25
 fees charged for work which was unneces-
29
 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 515 (student ed. 1986). Similarly,
the Supreme Court of West Virginia surveyed a number of cases and concluded that "cases
in which disciplinary sanctions were imposed for charging or collecting an illegal or clearly
excessive attorney's fee involve circumstances indicating the attorney's bad faith or intent
to evade a fee-limiting statute." Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Cole-
man, 377 S.E.2d 485, 492 (W. Va. 1988); see also Agthe, supra note 18, at 139 ("Frequently,
the charge against an attorney that he has violated a provision against the charging of ex-
cessive fees occurs in the context of other charges of professional misconduct.... Since
courts at times administer discipline on a collection of charges ... it is not always clear
whether the charging of an excessive fee would, of itself, have resulted in the same disci-
pline." (citing Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1957))) .
" Professors Hazard and Hodes assert that "only a truly outrageous fee—one ap-
proaching fraud—was a matter for professional censure." 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT § 1.5:201, at 111 & n.1 (2d ed. 1990 & Stipp. 1998) (citing Florida Bar v.
Winn, 208 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1968) (holding fee excessive where attorney, in violation of a
contract, claimed against sums he had no part in recovering)). Professor Rhode has ob-
served that "lciourts are reluctant to second-guess fee agreements, and clients are likely to
get relief only in egregious cases." Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 665, 714 (1994); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46
cmt. at 157 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] OH many juris-
dictions, authorities have been reluctant to discipline lawyers" for charging unreasonably
high fees.).
21 See 7 Am. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 63 (1997).
22 See In reKutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1979); see also discussion infra Part II.B.
23
 See, e.g., In re Burgess, 270 S.E.2d 436 (S.C. 1980) (involving multiple forms of mis-
conduct, but the basis for the conclusion that the fee was unreasonable is not clear from
the opinion).
24 See ?nver v. State Bar of Cal., 688 P.2d 911. 917-18 (Cal. 1984) (holding that in ad-
dition to other misconduct, the attorney claimed a fee that was illegal and "not supported
by any written evidence of a fee agreement"); In re Giordano, 229 A.2d 524, 531 (N.J.
1967) (holding that, in addition to other misconduct, attorney charged his client an usu-
rious rate of interest); Hudock v. Virginia State Bar, 355 S.E.2d 601, 603-04 (Va. 1987)
(holding that attorney demanded fee in excess of that approved by government authority,
in violation of statute).
25
 Seem re Stnithers, 877 P.2d 789, 795-96 (Ariz. 1994) (concluding that, in addition to
other misconduct, attorney took his share of a contingent fee based on total claim, not
what was actually recovered, mid improperly sought "double recovery of fees" by collecting
both court awarded fees and a contingency fee); Florida Bar v. Hollander, 607 So. 2d 412,
415 (Fla. 1992) (disciplining attorney who terminated representation without cause and
8
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sary,26 not in fact performed27 or already paid for;28 lying to or steal-
ing from clients;29 and fees set by the attorney in self-dealing transac-
tions." Some of the cases do not involve attorney discipline under
the excessive fee rules at allm and most if not all could have been
then attempted to "collect twice for the same work" by demanding both quantum meruit
compensation and a percentage of any recovery by a new attorney); Kentucky Bar Ass'n
Newberg, 839 S.W.2d 280, 280431 (Ky. 1992) (censuring lawyer who collected contingent
fee from government benefits, when representation was in connection with civil rights
claim that resulted in no recovery).
26 See In re Kunkle, 218 N.W.2d 521, 535-36 (S.D. 1974) (concluding that, in addition
to other misconduct, attorney delayed case by performing unnecessary work to claim
greater fees).
21 See People v. Walker, 832 P.2d 935, 935-37 (Colo. 1992) (disciplining attorney for
falsifying bills); In re Schneca, 962 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Kan. 1998) (concluding that in addi-
tion to other misconduct, lawyer charged for work not clone); In re Genser, 589 N.V.S.2c1
566, 567 (App. Div. 1992) (concluding that in addition to other misconduct, lawyer
charged fee but "failed to perform any legal services on his client's behalf); Cleveland Bar
Ass'n v. Character-Floyd, 699 N.E.2d 922, 923 (Ohio 1998) (concluding that in addition to
other misconduct, lawyer's time records failed to substantiate hours charged to client in
matter which also had been neglected); State ex reL Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Whiteley, 792 P.2d
1174, 1174-75 (Okla. 1990) (involving attorney who stipulated to discipline because, in
addition to other misconduct, attorney failed to perform work on the matter for which he
had accepted a fee); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Knepp, 441 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (Pa.
1982) (concluding that in addition to other misconduct, attorney charged a substantial
sum for representation in connection with an estate and then neglected the matter).
28 See Attorney Grievance Comet' of Md. v. Korotki, 569 A.2d 1224, 1232 (Md. 1990)
(involving attorney who demanded higher percentage of contingent recovery for handling
appeals, when he was already obligated to handle appeals by original contract); In re Ya-
cob, 860 P.2d 811, 814 (Or. 1993) (concluding that in addition to other misconduct, lawyer
demanded additional payment for work covered by a flat fee, which had already been paid
in full).
26 See Cushway v. State Bar, 170 S.E.2d 732, 733-34 (Ga. 1969) (concluding that in ac1 c
dition to other misconduct, lawyer unilaterally converted trust property to pay fees which
had not been agreed upon); In re Gerard, 634 N.E.2d 51, 53-54 (Ind. 1994) (discplining
attorney on a reciprocal basis for constructive fraud committed in Illinois, who failed to
explain, in contingent fee case, that light to recovery was uncontested) (citing In re
Gerard, 548 N.E.24 1051 (Ill. 1989) (noting that attorney took more than the contractual
one-third fee)); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d
107, 114 (W. Va. 1986) (involving attorney who "misrepresented the difficulty in obtaining
the life insurance proceeds" in order to induce client to agree to a contingent fee in what
was in fact an uncontested matter).
33 See In re Vitko, 519 N.W.2d 206, 208 (Minn. 1994) (involving attorney who, in addi-
tion to other misconduct, deceived his client into making hint trustee of irrevocable trust
and then paid himself substantial fees from trust assets); In re Forester, 530 N.W.2d 375,
385-86 (Wis. 1995) (concluding that in addition to other misconduct, lawyers used their
positions as trustees to insinuate themselves into the business in which the trust held stock
and paid themselves large fees).
31 See State ex reL Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Neb. 1975) (dis-
ciplining attorney under Disciplinary Rule ("DR") DR 7-102(A) (5) for making false
statement in connection with billing for services); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Zauderer, 687
December 1999]
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punished under other rules prohibiting fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. 32
If these cases are representative, then the excessive fee rules, for
all practical purposes, are dead." Nonetheless, many clients are furi-
N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ohio 1997) (disciplining attorney for failing to maintain records of funds
coming into his possession under DR 9-102(8)(3)); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n Nienaber, 628
N.E.2d 1340, 1341 (Ohio 1994) (disciplining attorney for billing client for personal vaca-
tion, which was a violation of DR 7-102(A) (5)).
32 Similarly, the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual identifies six circumstances in which lawyers
have been disciplined for charging excessive fees: accepting a contingent fee where there
is in fact little risk, exceeding a statutory fee limit, refusing to return unearned fees or
otherwise imposing a penalty on a client for exercising their right to fire an attorney, pad-
ding bills, failing to account for changed circumstances, and charging high fees relative to
the value of the services provided. See LAWYERS MANUAL, supra note 18, § 41:314—:317. All
of the cases cited in the last category involved bad faith or other kinds of misconduct. See
People v. Underhill, 708 P.2d 790, 790-91 (Colo. 1985) (concluding among other miscon-
duct, attorney continued to represent client and collect excessive fee after suspension);
Florida Bar v. Mirabole, 498 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1986) (holding $24,000 bill excessive
where $3000 at stake); KorotIci, 569 A.2d at 1232 (concluding attorney demanded compen-
sation for work already obliged to perform); Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Pagak, 528
N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ohio 1988) (concluding that, in addition to other misconduct, attorney
coercively demanded additional compensation based on changes in case that involved no
extra work); Myers v. Virginia State Bar, 312 S.E.2(1286, 292 (Va. 1989) (concluding that in
addition to other misconduct, attorney accepted fee in excess of that authorized by court
and lied to client about it); West Va. State Bar Connn't on Legal Ethics v. Gallaher, 376
S.E.2d 346, 348, 350 (W. Va. 1988) (holding 50% contingent fee excessive where there was
no written agreement, fee was set unilaterally after settlement and the case settled without
consultation with client).
The contingent fee line of cases could in principle also be regarded as a counterex-
ample. They seem, however, to impose discipline not simply because the lawyers involved
received a large recovery in relation to the work performed, but rather because the fee
exceeded a percentage rule established by law, or because there was at least an implicit
misleading of the client by failing to disclose, when establishing the fee, that there was in
fact no contingency or that it was likely to be far cheaper to pay on an hourly basis. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 145
(Fla. 1975) (concluding that the contingent fee was excessive where there was no contin-
gency and asset at issue had passed to client by operation of law); Harmon v. Pugh, 248
S.E.2d 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (reducing contingent fee award but imposing no disci-
pline); In re Stafford, 216 P.2d 746, 751-52 (Wash. 1950) (involving attorney who, among
other misconduct, charged a 50% fee for arranging delivery of funds which different cli-
ent had hired him to deliver).
33
 One reason the American Jurisprudence cases appear to be representative is that in
addition to the many discipline cases read, the members of the Legal Ethics law professors'
e-mail listsery were asked if they knew of any cases where a lawyer was disciplined solely for
charging an excessive fee. The cases they identified in fact all involved additional forms of
misconduct. See, e.g., State Florida Bar v. Winn, 208 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla, 1968) (involving
fee agreement giving attorney 50% of any stuns he was "instrumental in recovering," but
attorney charged for sums which passed to client by operation of law without any effort on
his part); In re Tuley, 907 P.2d 844 (Kan. 1995) (involving attorney who stipulated that he
was guilty of charging unreasonable fee of $115.000 to settle estate and "admitted that he
10
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ous that their attorneys have charged them large fees. 34• Disputes over
fees have been "universally recognized as constituting the most seri-
ous problem in the relationship between the Bar and the public." 35
Moreover, the public's perception that lawyers charge too much for
their services reportedly has increased in recent years. 35 Furthermore,
many lawyers earn extremely large incomes. 37 Accordingly, the lack of
prosecution, demands an explanation, which, upon inspection, is not
difficult to find. Both the development of the rules and their content
invite lawyers themselves and those evaluating their conduct to as-
sume that any fee complies with the rules in the absence of dishonesty
or bad faith. In essence, it is not clear whether the rules provide that a
had no idea of the tune he had spent during the affairs of this estate"); In re Simmonds,
415 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (Mimi. 1987) (concluding fee unreasonable where part of it was
taken in violation of "social security regulations [requiring] governmental approval," and
part of expenses charged to client were used "to take a personal vacation"); Ex rel. Okla.
Bar Ass'n v. Weeks, 969 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1998) (disciplining attorney/law professor for
claiming both contingent fee and statutory fee award as provided by contract but in viola-
tion of federal law); Cushitic v. State Bar of Texas, 845 S.W.2d 358, 359-60 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992) (applying reciprocal discipline in case where attorney consented to discipline
in the Northern Marianas Islands for quintupling his fee to $2500 per hour after victory
when client had not agreed in writing to contingent fee); In re Bult, 469 N.W.2d 653, 654
(Wis. 1991) (disciplining attorney for charging $5775 in connection with sale of home
which netted $9800 where attorney failed to present time records justifying charges to the
client or disciplinary board).
s4 See WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 513; Cassandra M. Neely, Case Comment, Excessive
Fees and Attorney Discipline: The Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 90 W. VA. L. REV.
562, 562-63 (1987/1988); Daniel Wise & Charles F. De Jager, Prices, Quality Irk General
Counsels: Report of Survey on Outside Lauyers, 210 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1993).
55 SPECIAL COMM. ON RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES OF THE SECTION OF BAR ACTIVI-
TIES, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE RESOLUTION OF FEE DISPUTES: A REPORT AND MODEL
BYLAWS 1 (undated). See also Oklahoma Turnpike Auth. v. New Life Pentecostal Church,
870 P.2d 762, 768 n.23 (Okla. 1994) ("No single area of attorney conduct is more suscepti-
ble to public scrutiny and criticism than a lawyer's fee contract."); Richard C. Reed, Fore-
word CO BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS
at iii (Richard C. Reed ed., 1989) (indicating the existence of dissatisfaction by clients
regarding hourly billing); Sonia S. Chan, Note, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Billing,
Padding and Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 611, 612 (1996) (same);
Neely, supra note 34, at 562. But see Alan Scott Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorneys' Fees:
The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005, 2005 (1993) (asserting that there is little reliable
information on the existence or frequency of fee disputes).
36 See Chan, supra note 35, at 612. In fact, it seems that the public's perception of law-
yers as unethical is based in part on the billing practices of some of the members of the
legal profession. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 379 (1993).
37 In one famous instance, lawyers at an elite firm working on a very large commercial
matter were paid $20 million for two weeks work, a minimum of $5000 per lawyer per
hour. See Stephen J. Adler & Laurie P. Cohen, Even Lawyers Gasp Over Stiff Fees of Waddell
Lipton, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1988, available in 1988 WI., WSJ 453233.
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fee has to be merely unreasonable or extremely unreasonable to war-
rant discipline, and the factors by which either question is evaluated
are so broad as to be indeterminate.
A. The Standard for Discipline
At common law," only fees so high that they necessarily rested on
"fraudulent and dishonest motives"" or were "so exorbitant and
wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the
conscience"'" were considered appropriate matters for discipline.41
99 The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics of 1908 informed the development of the
common law to some degree. See CANONS or PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). Canon 12 sug-
gested that fees be neither too high nor too low, and gave some factors for evaluating fees.
See id. Canon 12. Perhaps because the Canons WM so vague, and not so widely adopted as
positive law as later codes, the C.anons seem not to have been the dominant source of law
with respect to attorneys' fees, at least in the disciplinary context.
39 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v Pio, 139 N.E. 45, 47 (Ill. 1923).
49 Goldstone v, State Bar, 6 P.2d 513, 516 (Cal. 1931).
41 As one conunentator explained, at common law, "[a] number of cases have recog-
nized that an excessive fee is not enough, in the absence of other factors, to warrant disci-
plinary action against an attorney, some of the cases also recognizing, however, that where
a fee is so clearly excessive in comparison to the services rendered that it could not have
been charged in good faith, discipline will be warranted." H.H. Henry, Annotation, Amount
or Character of Compensation as Ground for Disci Away Action Against Attorney, 70 A.L.R.2d 962,
965 (1960). See also, e.g., In re ?Orland, 284 P.2d 56, 60 (Ariz. 1939) (holding that fee must
be so excessive and unconscionable as to indicate bad faith); Herrscher V. State Bar, 49 P.2d
832, 833-34 (Cal. 1935) (concluding claim of excessiveness of fee alone not sufficient in
disciplinary proceeding absent failure of disclosure, fraud or overreachi ►g); Grievance
Comm. v. Ennis, 80 A. 767, 770 (Conn. 1911) (holding fee not excessive if it is not "extor-
tionate" by way of oppression or illegality); In re Annabel, 229 N.Y.S. 385, 386 (App. Div.
1928) (per curiam) (noting that fees must be unconscionable, tantamount to a misappro-
priation of client funds); In re Greer, 380 P.2d 482, 486 (Wash. 1963) (en banc) (conclud-
ing question of "reasonableness" of fee appropriate matter for civil court and question of
"thaccniscionability" of fee appropriate matter for disciplinary proceeding), overruled by In re
Boehm., 985 P.2d 328, 336 (Wash. 1999); In reWiltsie, 186 P. 848, 848 (Wash. 1920) (reason-
ing that because the "question (of the propriety of fees] is so much a matter of individual
opinion ... it should not be the basis for disbarment except in the most aggravated and
extreme case"); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 320 (1968) ("An attorney
has the right to contract for any fee he chooses so long as it is not excessive (see Opinion
190), and this Committee is not concerned with the amount of such fees unless so exces-
sive as to constitute a misappropriation of the client's funds (see Opinion 27)."); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 209 (1940); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 190 (1939); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 27 (1930); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 174
(1953) ('There is no ethical question involved unless fees are flagrantly excessive. . . ."); 1
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 20, § 1.5:201, at 111 (indicating that before the adoption of
the Model Code, only outrageous fees, approaching fraud, were appropriate for censure);
Neely, supra note 34, at 566. Some jurisdictions apparently continue to follow this ap-
proach. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-200(8)(2) (1992)
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Thus, in In re Greer, the Washington Supreme Court disciplined an
attorney for charging a contingent fee in a civil case, but basing his
share on an amount greater than the sum in fact recovered. 42 There,
the attorney also "reimbursed" himself for expenditures which in fact
had not been incurred. 43
 As to certain other questionable sums
charged by the attorney, the court agreed with the disciplinary com-
mittee that they were excessive under the circumstances, but not un-
conscionable, and therefore did not warrant disciplinary proceed-
ings.'" It is difficult to see the sanctioned behavior as anything other
than fraud, and surely charging such fees is unreasonable, but this
approach suggests that fees established and calculated in good faith
are inappropriate subjects for discipline.
In another widely cited common law case, Bushman v. State Bar of
California, the Supreme Court of California imposed discipline be-
cause it believed that the attorney had falsified the bill. 45 The attorney
in Bushman agreed to defend in a divorce action Barbara Cox, her
boyfriend, Ralph Hughes, and her parents, Mr. & Mrs. Stroud. 46 Be-
cause there was no community property, the only substantial issue was
custody of Ms. Cox's child, although there was a possibility, which
never came to pass, that Hughes would be charged with statutory rape
because Ms. Cox was a minor. 47
 Bushman demanded that Ms. Cox, the
Strouds and Hughes sign a $5000 note to secure a fee based on a $60
hourly rate.48 No criminal or other related litigation developed, and
after the case settled quickly by stipulation in Ms. Cox's favor, Bush-
man received a $360 fee and expense award from the court, payable
by Ms. Cox's ex-husband.49
 Bushman failed to mention to the court
(forbidding "unconscionable fees"); TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON
DUCT Rule 1.04(a) (1991) (an attorney must not charge or collect an excessive or "uncon-
scionable fee"; a fee is unconscionable if, after reviewing all the facts, a competent lawyer
could not form the belief that the fee is reasonable); Committee on Legal Ethics of the W.
Va. State Bar v. Coleman, 377 S.E.2d 485, 492 (W. Va. 1988) (good faith in setting fee not
appropriate for sanction).
42 See 380 P.2c1 at 487.
43 See id.
." See id. at 485.
45 522 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1974).
46 See id. at 313.
47 See id,
48 See id.
49 See id. at 313-14.
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that he expected further fees.5° By contrast, Ms. Cox's ex-husband
paid his lawyer a total of $300 plus costs.51
Bushman billed his clients an additional $2800 and claimed that
he spent a total of over 100 hours on the case, which would justify a
$6000 bill.52 The California Supreme Court was clearly skeptical, not-
ing that "Bushman did not produce any records to substantiate his
claim that he had spent 100 hours on the Cox matter," 53 and that "Mt
is of some significance in this connection that [Mr.] Cox's attorney
spent slightly more than five hours on the case."54 In response to
Bushman's argument that the case was complex, the court noted that
"[a] n examination of the file in the Cox matter reveals that only a
simple, almost routine series of documents was filed by Bushman."55
Because the note and retainer agreement "imposed liability on all
four as joint and several obligors, without regard to the value of the
legal services rendered to each,"56
 because the value of the services
rendered appeared disproportionate to the fee, and because Bush-
man failed to disclose the fee agreement to the trial court, the court
concluded that Bushman's "course of conduct ... contained an ele-
ment of fraud or overreaching warranting disciplinary action!" 57
The common law also recognized a middle ground, which con-
tinues to be applied under the codes. Some were judged by courts not
to be so unreasonable as to create grounds for discipline, but too
large to be enforceable. 58 As the Restatement of the Law Governing Law-
yers ("Restatement") explains: "For a variety of reasons, discipline might
" See Bushman, 522 P.2d at 314.
51 See id,
52 See id.
" Id.
" Id. at 315.
55 Bushman, 522 P.2d at 315.
56
 Id. at 315.
57 See id. at 315-16.
" See, e.g., McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1985). The
court in McKenzie noted that "Mlle ethical rules spring from the belief that certain kinds
of behavior cannot be tolerated by a society of professionals." Id. Thus, under the language
of DR 2-106(B), the court determined that it may often be unfair to sanction au attorney
for an objectively "unreasonable" fee which is not "clearly excessive." See id. at 101. In con-
trast, matters involving the civil enforcement of fees "should [not] be based on as stringent
a showing," rather, according to the court, should be determined under au "equity and
fairness" standard, See id.; cf. United States v. Strawser, 581 F. Supp. 875, 877 (C.D. Ill.
1984) (finding $47,500 fee for negotiating two fairly simple guilty pleas to drug charges
was excessive considering, inter alia, that attorney possessed no extraordinary ability and it i
fact rendered average services), aff'd, 800 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1986).
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be withheld for charging a fee that would nevertheless be set aside as
unreasonable in a fee-dispute proceeding." 59
Although the common-law approach was informed to some ex-
tent by the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics of 1908 ("Canons"), the
first true ABA code was the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Model Code"),6° promulgated in 1969. The Model Code was replaced in
1983 by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). 61 The
codes continue to regulate fees. 62
" RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46 ant. at 157-58; see also KANSAS RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) ("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable but a court determina-
don that a fee is not reasonable shall not be presumptive evidence of a violation that re-
quires discipline of the attorney."); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 cult. at 101 (1979) ("Generally, ... even a finding
that a lawyer has charged an excessive fee does not, in itself, warrant disciplinary action.
Other elements of wrongdoing (overreaching, appropriation of the client's funds under
the guise of charging a fee, and so forth) have to be present.") (citing 1 STUART M.
SPEISER, ArroiuvEy's FEES § 1.37 (1973)).
6° The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969, replaced the Can-
ons. The ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, appointed in August
of 1964, recognized a need for change in the Canons' statements of what constituted pro-
fessional responsibility:
The present Canons are not an effective teaching instrument and they fail to
give guidance to young lawyers beyond the language of the Canons them-
selves. There is no organized interrelationship of the Canons and they often
overlap. They are not cast in language designed for disciplinary enforcement
and many abound with quaint expressions of the past.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at vi (Preliminary Draft 1969).
The Model Code incorporates the substance of the provisions of the Canons, and Con-
sists of three separate parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. See 1
ROBERT L. Rossi, Arrousrevs' FEES § 1:18, at 53 n.78 (2d ed. 1995); SPEISER, supra note
59, § 1:36, at 49 n.5. Speiser notes that:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms,' expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relation-
ships with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. The
Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character, and represent the objec-
tives toward which every member of the profession should strive. The Disci-
plinary Rules are mandatory in character, and state the lowest level of con-
duct, below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action.
SPEISER, supra note 59, § 1:36, at 49 n.5; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY preliminary statement (1980). For an exhaustive treatment of the history, purposes
and functions of lawyer codes in the United States, see WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 48-63.
Si On August 2, 1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules, which re-
placed the separate parts of the Model Code with a single set of rules. See Rossi, supra note
60, § 1:18, at 53 n.79. By 1972, a vast majority of jurisdictions had adopted the Model Code.
See SPEISER, supra note 59, § 1:36, at 49 11.5. After the ABA replaced the Model Code with the
Model Rules, most jurisdictions adopted the latter. To date, at least 40 jurisdictions have
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Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 2-106(A) of the Model Code provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or col-
lect an illegal or clearly excessive fee."63 DR 2-106(B) explains that
"[a] fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."" A footnote to the
"clearly excessive" language in DR 2-106 cites pre-Code ABA opinions
and other authority using the common-law misappropriation test. 65
This comment may suggest that despite the differing language, the
Model Code was intended to continue the pre-Code common-law stan-
dard.66
Rule 1.5 of the Model Rules changed the language again, requir-
ing simply that "[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable," 67 Because the
Model Code prohibits fees that are "clearly excessive," and the Model
adopted the Model Rules in whole or in part, including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawai'i, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island. South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. See 2 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 20, § AP4:107, at 1269; Michael Sacksteder, Note, Formal Opinion 95-390
of the ABA's Ethics Committee: Corporate Clients, Conflicts of Interest, and Keeping the Lid on Pan-
dora's Box, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 741, 745 11.12 (1997). Although New York, Oregon and Vir-
ginia have retained amended versions of the Model Code, their versions incorporate several
portions of the Model Rules. See id. at 745 11.13. In addition, Illinois and North Carolina
incorporate substance of both the Model Code and Model Rules. See id. Califoinia's rules of
professional conduct do not rely on the Model Code or the Model Rules. See id.
62 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule L5 (1983). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993) (implicit in the Model Rules and their ante-
cedents is the notion that the attorney-client relationship is not necessarily one of equals,
that it is built on trust. and that the client is encouraged to be dependent on the lawyer
is MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1980).
64 Id. DR 2-106(B).
66 Id. DR 2-106(A) at n.88.
66 This, however, may not be the case; the footnotes are not necessarily authoritative
interpretations of the Code. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble
at n.! (1980). Nevertheless, there is no hint that the Model Code intended to break with the
past, and the similarities in terms suggest continuity. For example, DR 2-106 prohibits
"clearly excessive" fees; the footnote cites a common-law case which also uses the "clearly
excessive" standard. See id. DR-106(A) at n.88 (citing State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n
v. Richards, 84 N.W.2d 136, 143 (Neb. 1957)). Moreover, in opinions applying the Model
Code, the ABA continued to cite common-law authority. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1461 (1980) (relying on Formal Op. 27 (1930)).
67 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
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Rules requires that fees be "reasonable,"68 some have argued that the
Model Rules adopts a stricter test under which a high fee is more likely
to be found unreasonable.69 Moreover, under the Model Code, the as-
sessment of the excessiveness of the fee is to be determined from the
standpoint of the "lawyer of ordinary prudence."79 The Model Rules
omits this language from the provisions of Rule 1.5, and thus appar-
ently adopts the point of view of the "ordinary prudent person." This
change also may hint at more rigorous regulation. 71
A "clearly excessive" fee under DR 2-106(A), however, was
defined as one that was more than reasonable. 72 Accordingly, under
both the Model Code and the Model Rules, the test seems to be whether
or not the fee is reasonable. If the word "reasonable" means the same
thing in the Model Rules and the Model Code, it may be that the newer
Model Rules continue the lawyer-friendly common-law standard of the
Model Code. 73
68 Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1980) with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
69 See In re Dorothy, 605 N.W.2d 493, 499 (S.D. 2000) ("Under Rule 1.5, the bench-
mark for triggering judicial review of fees has been lowered and its scope broadened ....
Thus, for disciplinary action to be imposed, it is now only necessary that a fee be unrea-
sonable in proportion to the services performed."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, jr. & W. William
Hodes, A Look at the Ethical Rules; Fee Shifting in the Federal Courts, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE
HOUR, supra note 35, at 123, 124; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1509 (1984) (indicating that the intent iu changing the language
from the Model Code's "clearly excessive" standard to the Model Rules' test of reasonableness
was to impose a stricter standard on lawyers who would charge too much"). But see Rhode,
supra note 20, at 714 (asserting that the change in terminology from the Model Code to the
Model Rules has not had a significant impact upon the outcomes of reported cases).
70 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1980) (emphasis
added).
71 It is a common presumption when interpreting statutes that a change in language
implies a change in the meaning. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 336 (1992)
(noting 'the familiar maxim that, when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must in-
tend to change the statute's meaning") (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24
(1983)).
72 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A), (B) (1980).
73 See, e.g., In re Gerard, 634 N.E.2d 51, 53 n.5 (Ind. 1994) (noting that the Indiana ver-
sion of DR 2-105 "contains virtually identical provisions" as the Indiana version of MR 1.5
which replaced it). See Holmes v. SIPC, 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("we can only assume
[Congress] intended [words] to have the same meaning that courts have already given
them"); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 n.14 (1977) ("When the phrase 'in con-
cert' has been used in other statutes, it has generally connoted cooperative action and
agreement. [citations omitted] This suggests that Congress intended the same words to
have the same meaning [in the statute in question]."); Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co.,
225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912) ("it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidat-
ing the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed").
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The official connnents to both the Model Rules'and the Model Code
fail to explain whether their language modified the previously prevail-
ing substantive standard (in the process effectively overruling all of
the cases decided under the prior regime), and if so, how. The codes
therefore may present a mysterious standard to attorneys and disci-
plinary authorities, encouraging the former to measure reasonable-
ness by what a client is willing to pay and the latter to assume that an
holiest bargain is not unreasonable.
B. The Non-Exclusive, Eight -Factor Test For Reasonableness
A critical portion of the Canons was retained with modifications
in the Model Code, namely, in the factors used to measure the reason-
ableness of a fee. The Model Rules, in turn, adopted the Model Code's
factors verbatim.74 Both the Model Code and the Model Rules employ an
elaborate eight-part test, which includes:
(1 )The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
legal questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform
the legal service properly;
(2)The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employ-
ment by the lawyer;
(3)The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4)The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5)The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circum-
stances;
(6)The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client;
(7)The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or law-
yers performing the services; and
(8)Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.75
This test is non-exclusive; lawyers and courts are free to consider
other factors. Other recognized factors include the client's ability to
74 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-10G(B) (1980); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Canon 12 (1908).
75 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(x)(1)-(8) (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1)-(8) (1980).
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pay a fee," and the. principle that a sophisticated client's arms-length
agreement is virtually unassailable. 77 In the absence of fixed fee
schedules, it is difficult to use these factors to reach definitive re-
sults." Rarely will all of the factors point in the same direction; the
rules give no guidance as to how ambiguous situations should be re-
solved. Understandably, most lawyers and disciplinary authorities as-
sume that, in a gray area, an honest bargain should be respected."
76 See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Cox, 304 A.2d 55, 57 (Del. 1973); State ex rel.
Hodge v. Town of Turtle Lake, 526 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Wis. 1994); see generally WoLFRArd,
supra note 19, at 521.
77 See Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1999)
(upholding non-refundable one million dollar fee, even though attorneys discharged after
ten weeks because "the fact that the client[] received some intangible benefits [i.e., having
counsel of choice available) in retaining the attorneys meant that the [district court] could
conclude that the compensation ... was not so high as to be inequitable and unfair");
Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 843 (2d Cir. 1986); Puerto Rico v. Heckler, 745 F.2d
709, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that the"[i] ndicia of overall reasonable-
ness [of the fee include that party was] a sophisticated client"); Shapiro, Lifschitz &
Schram v. R.E. Hazard, Jr., 24 F. Stipp. 2d 66, 77 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that as a matter of
law, fees were not unreasonable because clients were "sophisticated commercial parties
who could have retained any firm" and no claim of fraud or duress was made); Alexander
v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689, 694 (Tenn. 1998) (listing client sophistication as a factor); Bo-
hatch v. Butler & Billion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 554 (Tex. 1998) (finding that "[a] fee that a
client as sophisticated as Pennzoil considers reasonable is not clearly excessive simply be-
cause a lawyer believes it could have been less"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46 cult. at
160 ("Fees agreed to by clients sophisticated in entering into such arrangements ...
should almost invariably be found reasonable."); WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 520 ("If the
client is a large corporation and is represented in setting the fee by independent counsel
who is protecting the corporation's interests, it is doubtful that any fee negotiated and
agreed to by the client, no matter how large, would be considered excessive.") (citing Bro-
beck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979)).
76 There are instances when decisionmakers have no choice but to calculate an appro-
priate fee, including calculating a quantum ineruit or statutory fee award, oz• when ap-
proval of a fee is required by law, as in a class action settlement. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of
Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that when awarding fees pur-
suant to statute, "the object is to simulate the market where a direct market determination
is infeasible") (quoting In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992));
see also In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 127 F.3d 1398, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997). These
situations are difficult and challenging, but they require the decision maker to calculate a
reasonable fee, not the entire range of reasonable fees.
79 See ROBERT H. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND
REVIEW 7 (1980). Professor Aronson asserts that legal representation will often be "price-
less" to the client receiving the benefit of the services. See id. For example, can the value of
an acquittal on criminal charges be measured? If loss of liberty through incarceration was
at stake, a very strong argument could be made that the value of good legal representation
contributing to the preservation of such liberty is in fact priceless. See id. At the very least,
depending upon the personal importance of legal representation to the client, the services
will have a different value for some clients than for others. See id. One of the components
of legal representation is the lawyer's ability to provide the client access to "justice." Ac-
cording to Professor Aronson, "the noninonetary nature of justice' may preclude accurate
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Few defend the Model Code and Model Rules factors as useful tools
of analysis or deny they provide little guidance in identifying the "clearly
excessive" or "unreasonable" attorneys' fees that warrant discipline. 8°
Professor Hazard has observed that application of "[a]ny eight-factor
test produces a wide range of outcomes, particularly [where, as here]
some of those factors are indeterminate."81 Professor Wolfram, like-
wise, observed that:
the single standard of an excessive fee, as stated in all of the
lawyer codes, is necessarily vague because of the greatly var-
ied settings in which fees are charged, and thus uncertain in
its application. 82
valuation of lawyers' services." Id. Moreover, pursuant to the concept of res judicata, each
individual lawsuit is perceived to be unique, further complicating the goal of accurate
valuation of the services contributed to that lawsuit. See id.
80 See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 69, at 124. Professors Hazard and Hodes assert that
under the Model Code, the eight factors are "not objective determinates but subjective fac-
tors." Id. Also, Professor Wolfram notes that the Model Code factors are indeterminate. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 517. The ABA itself has acknowledged that DR 2-106 "does not
prescribe the manner in which those factors are to be applied." ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 329 (1972); see also WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST
HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING )31' ATTORNEYS 40 (1996) (stating factors pro-
vide "only an amorphous outline for measuring the reasonableness of a fee"); Roy D.
SIMON, JR. & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 549 (3d ed.
1994) ("In short, the factors semis to be overlapping, and basically say you can charge what
the market will bear."); Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lauyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agree
ments with Lawyers, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581, 600 (1997) ("Reasonableness is a re-
markably elastic concept."); John .). Marquess, Legal Audits and Dishonest Legal Bills, 22 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 637, 638 (1994) (calling factors "nonsense" that do not tell the lawyer
"anything"); Lee A. Watson, Note, Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for
Maintaining Ethical Hourly Billing, 11 GEO. J.' LEGAL ETHICS 189, 197 (1998) (stating ethical
codes "require reasonable billing but fail to offer a definition for reasonableness").
Si See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 97 (1978); see also
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 can. at 101 (1979) ('The
implication appears to be that a consideration of the guides will lead a lawyer to formulate
reasonable fees. The wording of the text, however, denies this.... [T]he Code ... did not
proscribe any reasonable application of the factors that were to be considered as guides in
the setting of fees.").
89 WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 516; see also ARONSON, supra note 79, at 3 ("(T] he nature
of the lawyer's product and the bar's perception of its role it society combine to make
rational valuation of the individual attorney's services practically impossible,"); JETtuto K.
LIEBERMAN, CIUSIS AT THE BAR 108 (1978) (stating that EC 2-17 contains the only discus-
sion of the propriety of fees in the Ethical Considerations, and it is too general; DR 2-106
is also of little help); Ross, supra note 80, at 39, 40 (observing that because the Model Rules
do not specifically address time-based billing, many lawyers faced with ethical concerns in
this area may consult other attorneys rather than the Model Rules); Jeffrey L. Tolman,
Learning From How alms Bill, in BEYOND THE 13/LIABLE HOUR, supra note 35, at 69 (sug-
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Court decisions regarding legal fees offer little guidance because their
facts vary widely."
The specific factors are also deeply questionable. Professor Aron-
son is suspicious of factor two, loss of other employment by virtue of
accepting a particular matter. In this regard, Professor Aronson ar-
gues that "overreliance on time lost per se penalizes competent attor-
neys who most need to earn fair value for their services but whose
youth, inexperience, or transience puts them at a disadvantage in at-
tracting clients."84
The focus on the going rate reflected in factor three has a dubi-
ous pedigree; it dates to the price-fixing era, since repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court. 85 Some commentators suggest that fac-
tor three continues to justify overbilling practices so long as they are
common." It would also have odd consequences if it were actually
enforced. In a market which no longer relies on fixed prices, there
will usually be a distribution of fees, and someone will always have the
highest fee. If the highest chargers are at risk for discipline, they will
tend to go into another area of practice or lower their fees. Conse-
quently, another attorney or group of attorneys will be at the top and
the cycle will continue, imposing constant downward pressure on fees.
gesting that determining what constitutes a "fair and reasonable bill is the second most
difficult aspect of practicing law," and that "[clollecting the bill is the first"); Neely, supra
note 34, at 563 (concluding that case law, ethical canons, and disciplinary rules are unpro-
ductive in determining excessiveness of fees); see generally Steven R. Salbu, Law and Confor-
mity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Lazo-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. 1.4. 101, 102
• (1992) ("Codes of ethics provide a sadly diluted notion of what ethics entails, how ethical
decisions are made, and the nature and degree of individual responsibility involved in the
process of examining one's choices.").
" See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145, 148 (Fla. 1975) ("Few, if any, areas of
attorney discipline are as subject to differing interpretations as the matter of what consti-
tutes an excessive attorney's fee."); State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, 191 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1966)
(holding that statute criminalizing "unreasonable" attorney's fees in adoption cases is un-
constitutionally vague); ARONSON, supra note 79, at 12, 15 (asserting that "the standard of
'reasonableness' used by the courts suffers from the imprecision of 'proximate cause' and
'prudent person' that often results in tort cases standing on their ONin facts and the (ju-
ries'] moods" and "virtually no case law has developed interpreting" DR 2-106).
" ARONSON, supra note 79, at 35.
85 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975) (stating fee schedule
promulgated by local bar association constituted illegal price fixing).
88 See, e.g., Lester Briclunan, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the Disciplinary
System: The Case Against Case-By-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1353 (1996)
(noting that rules can justify common but unfair practice of charging excessive contingent
fee); Gillers, supra note 80, at 596 ("The fee can ... be higher than a strictly economic
calculation of market value because the market may support fees based on client igno-
rance.").
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This movement has not occurred, but it might if the rules were en-
forced. This result may help explain why they are not.
The fourth factor, the results obtained, seems entirely reasonable
if the fee is contingent, but that circumstance is covered by factor
eight. If the fee is non-contingent, why should the results obtained
matter? Concretely, why should lawyers who work honestly and dili-
gently on the basis of a fixed fee or an hourly rate be subject to disci-
pline if they lose, when their fee for entirely identical services would
be deemed reasonable if they win? 87
The other consideration in factor foul; the amount involved, as-
sumes that the only value is money. Concerns such as avoiding a death
sentence or prison term; preventing deportation from the United
States; obtaining custody or visitation of one's children; retaining a
particular job or office; protecting the sentimental value of particular
real estate or personal property, or an individual's reputation; and
standing on matters of principle, do not count at all. Presumably this
is an oversight, but it is a serious one. It also seems to give the attorney
an almost proprietary interest in every case; it suggests that an attor-
ney "may be able to do a small amount of work with great reward." 88
Other than to the extent that a lawyer is entitled to take into account
his or her potentially greater liability when handling a relatively large
matter, "the quality of the representation in terms of the time, effort,
and expertise expended would seem to be a better basis for valua-
tion."89
The fifth factor, time limits imposed by the client, seems irrele-
vant, given that actual time spent is considered by factor one and air
inability to accept other business is accounted for 'by factor two. Pro-
fessor Wolfram asks which way factor six points: "It is not apparent
whether longevity in a client-lawyer relationship is meant to justify a
higher or only a lower fee."'"
Professor Aronson criticizes factor seven, the experience, reputa-
tion and expertise' of the attorney. 91
 He suggests that "this factor, too,
would appear to be more appropriately subsumed under a general
consideration of the quality of work, and its importance should be
87 This assumes a single factor can be outcome determinative in at least some cases. If
it cannot, however, then it is not really a factor at all,
88 ARONSON, supra note 79, at 42.$9 Id.
98 WOLFRAN1, supra note 19, at 520.
81 See ARONSON, supra note 79, at 44.
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greatly diminished when the case does not require the attorney's
unique skills.”92
The process is made more difficult because lawyers are of neces-
sity responsible for the initial evaluation of the reasonableness of their
fees.93
 The codes use factors including the attorney's skill, ability and
reputation. Since most lawyers probably believe that the services they
render are of high quality and that they are esteemed by their col-
leagues and the community, the attorney's services always justify a
large fee."
The factors also fail to make clear when the reasonableness of the
fee is to be measured. The second factor, the likelihood, if apparent
to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer, contemplates evaluation at
the beginning of the representation because it is based on a predic-
tion about the future.93
 On the other hand, the results obtained, the
second part of factor four, cannot be known until the end of the rep-
resentation.
It also seems that the rules were designed for civil cases rather
than criminal cases. The first part of factor four, the amount involved,
would not take into account the possibility of imprisonment or execu-
don in evaluating the reasonableness of a fee. The rules also envision
the possibility of a contingent fee, which is prohibited in criminal
cases by both ABA codes.96
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (noting that "difficult
issues of professional discretion can arise," which must be resolved through "exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment" and that "compliance with the Rules, as with
all law in an open society, depends primarily on understanding and voluntary compli-
ance").
94 See HAZARD, supra note 81, at 101 ("A lawyer conceives of himself as worth a good
wage."). See alsol Timothy 5:18 ('The laborer is worthy of his reward."); Luke 10:7 (similar).
95
 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble ("[A]ssessment of a lawyer's
conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time
of the conduct in question.").
96 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(D) (2) (1983); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980). In addition, the process of setting
attorneys' fees in criminal matters is different than the process of setting fees ill
matters. See JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAWYER § 7:1, at 152 (2d ed. 1996). Rarely do noncriminal practitioners understand the
peculiarities of setting fees in the criminal setting. Fees for representation in criminal cases
might legitimately exceed fees for representation in civil cases for several reasons. See id.
First, the amount of "downtime" (e.g., waiting in court, waiting for hearings, etc.) for
criminal defense lawyers is higher than for noncriminal attorneys. See id. Second, criminal
lawyers must spend more time investigating and contemplating the adversary's case. See id.
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The Restatement implicitly criticizes the eight-factor test by citing it
and then recasting it as "really" getting at three questions which are
not explicitly mentioned:
Those [eight] factors might be viewed as responding to
three questions. First, when the agreement was made, did
the lawyer afford the client a free and informed choice? ...
Second, does the agreement provide for a fee within the
range commonly charged by other lawyers in similar repre-
sentations? ... Third, was there a subsequent change in cir-
cumstances that made the fee agreement unreasonable? 97
The first and third of these questions have much to commend them,
but they are not hinted at in the eight factors as written,
In sum, the factors as written may well include some which law-
yers would want to use in deciding whether to accept an engagement
at a particular price, and which clients would wish to consider when
deciding how much to spend on a lawyer for a particular matter.
Therefore, these factors may help explain, after the fact, why particu-
lar lawyers and clients agreed to particular fees in particular matters.
But it will be very difficult to use these factors to distinguish between
fair and unfair fees in the absolute sense because they are driven in
large part by the personal values of particular attorneys and clients."
Perhaps the most telling proof of the futility of evaluating the
reasonableness of fees is the ABA's own conduct. Although the ABA
has burdened lawyers and disciplinary authorities with the task of ana-
lyzing the reasonableness of legal fees in the context of an unhelpful
scheme, the ABA has refused to weigh in on the matter. The prestig-
ious ABA Ethics Committee offers written opinions with respect to
specific ethical questions which, when published, constitute
influential sources of authority. As early as 1930—nearly four decades
before the Model Code adopted the eight-factor test—the Committee
established a policy of refusing to offer opinions on the reasonable-
ness of fees in the absence of fraud or overreaching."
Finally, criminal defense lawyers deal in higher stakes than noncriminal lawyers, including
loss of liberty, or even loss of life. See id.
97 RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46, can. at 159-60.
" See AkomoN, supra note 79, at 56 ("Examination of these individual components of
service valuation shows that often their validity and value depend on whether worth is
determined from the attorney's or the client's perspective, and that reliance on one type
of criteria may restrict or eliminate meaningful examination of another.").
" See ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 101-02, 104-05 (1979)
(quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 27 (1930)).
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C. The Purpose of the Reasonable Fee Regulations
The problems with the Model Code and Model Rules that have led
to their desuetude are deeper than that they are badly drafted or too
complicated. Because the Model Code and Model Rules are intended to
be construed in accordance with their purpose," it would be helpful
to know why they exist. Articulated rationales for fee regulation break
down into two broad categories—maintaining access to the legal sys-
tem on behalf of the poor and prevention of abuse of the trust which
clients naturally repose in counsel. Only the second rationale is le-
gitimate, and even it does not justify regulating the amount of attor-
neys' fees.
I. Access to the Legal System for the Poor
One rationale for regulating fees, ultimately chimerical, rests on
the impact of excessive or unreasonable fees on public access to the
legal system.'°' For example, Ethical Consideration ("EC") 2-17 ex-
plains: "A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable fee, for
excessive cost of legal services would deter laymen from utilizing the
legal system in protection of their rights."102
 Fortner clients who were
charged excessive unreasonable fees and their friends may be de-
terred from hiring lawyers again, but other than to the extent that a
high fee results from deception or fraud, the argument is unpersua-
sive. Unfortunately, there is no ethical rule that legal services have to
be made available at a price the public is able to pay.
Moreover, if this consideration is addressed to individual lawyers,
the rationale would seem rarely to apply because an individual law-
yer's rates do not affect access to the legal system as a whole. If, for
example, Alan Dershowitz or Robert Bennett charge far more than
most lawyers, then the prospective client can simply hire one of the
other lawyers, and there is no diminution of access to the legal system.
Although the client may prefer to retain Dershowitz or Bennett at a
lower price, there is no ethical precept which says the lawyers who are
most desirable because they are the most able and effective have to be
available to the average person at an affordable price. Many of the
finest law firms in America charge rates which preclude all but the
wealthiest individuals and corporations from retaining them, yet no
10 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
101
 See, e.g., In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d 1280, 1288 (Ind. 1991); ARONSON, supra note 79,
at 6.
102 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-17 (1980).
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serious claim exists that, ipso facto, every dollar they bill is in violation
of the rules.'"
Alternatively, perhaps the principle is addressed to the profession
as a whole; that is, perhaps the reasonable fee limitation is designed to
encourage lawyers as a group not to raise their prices to a level which
the average person cannot afford. Of course, that has already hap-
pened, with no response from the ABA. Most individuals with legal
needs do not receive legal assistance to resolve them because of their
limited resources, not because prices have been fixed. Because the
ethics system does not propose that lawyers as a whole meet the legal
needs of the nation, the fact that a lawyer's fee is out of reach of a lay-
person does not suggest that it is excessive.
The treatment of pro bono work in the Model Code and Model
Rules confirms that the ethics provisions were not designed to make
sure that lawyers' fees are within the reach of the average person. Un-
der the Model Code, EC 8-3 recommended that "persons unable to pay
for legal services should be provided needed services." 10" This rec-
ommendation was merely precatory and unconnected to any re-
quirement or even suggestion that lawyers do pro bono work or ac-
cept some clients at reduced fees. Model Rule 6.1 encourages lawyers
to perform fifty hours annually of pro bono work, but this service is
not requirec05 The fact that pro bono work is necessary at all is a
tacit acknowledgment that even with fees being kept at a "reasonable"
level by Model Rule 1.5 and DR 2-106, there will be substantial unmet
legal needs; put another way, many people are unable to pay even rea-
sonable fees. 106 Because this principle is so limited, it does not support
the idea that fees should be low in any given case on pain of disci-
pline.
The Restatement, the American Law Institute's latest analysis of
this problem, makes clear that concern for access to the poor is
makeweight, not an actual rationale for limitations on attorneys' fees.
The Restatement grandly proclaims that "the availability of legal serv-
ices is often essential if people of limited means are to enjoy legal
rights. Those seeking to vindicate their rights through the private bar
103 Moreover, since lawyers are free to deprive individuals of their services by refusing
to work for them, or by practicing a specialty like emironmental law, which may not be
useful to most individuals, or by leaving the profession entirely, it is hard to see why lawyers
should not be equally free to withhold their services through price.
104 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-3 (1980)
1V3 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983).
108 See id, Rule 1.5; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980).
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should not be deterred by the risk of unwarranted fee burdens."H"
This is a fine aspiration, but the Restatement makes clear that there is
no impropriety in "a lawyer's insistence that a needy client pay for the
lawyer's services at the lawyer's usual rates. "108
2. Abuse of Fiduciary Relationship
Courts have also suggested that fee regulation is warranted to
protect the competent administration of justice, 109 to uphold and pre-
serve the integrity of the profession" 0
 and to deter other attorneys
from engaging in improper fee charging activities.m What these con-
cerns boil down to is not that handsome fees are to be avoided, but
rather that lawyers should not take advantage of their clients. Thus,
"[a] lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on
hourly charges by using wasteful procedures," explain the comments
to the Model Rules. 112
 The comments also say that a low estimate
should not be offered "when it is foreseeable that more extensive serv-
ices probably will be required," and that "when developments occur
during the course of representation that render an earlier estimate
substantially inaccurate, a revised estimate should be provided."" 3
107 RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46, ant. at 158.
108 Id. at 157.	 •
109 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,792 (1975); Sperry v. Florida ex ref
Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379,383 (1963); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117,123-24 (1961), over-
ruled on other grounds by Spevack V. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,513 (1967); In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d
1280,1288 (Ind. 1991).
110 See Smith, 572 N.E.2d at 1288; Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Pugh, 508 So. 2d 1350,
1355 (La. 1987); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413,415 (Utah 1978).
111 SeeARoNsom, supra note 79, at 5.
112 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 cmt. (1983).
113 Id. The Model Code also contains many statements suggesting that the purpose of the
reasonable fee rules is disclosure, in order to prevent overreaching. For example, EC 2-19
explains that a lawyer should
reach a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be
made. Such a course will not only prevent later misunderstanding but will
also work for good relations between the lawyer and the client. It is usually
beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the parties regarding the
fee.... A lawyer should be mindful that many persons . may have had little
or no experience with fee charges or lawyers, and for this reason he should
explain fully ... the reasons for the particular fee arrangement ....
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1980).
Similarly, EC 2-20 states that a contingent fee is permissible where a "client who, after
being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement." Id. EC 2-20; see also
id. EC 2-17 ("an excessive charge abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and
client").
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These concerns are matters of good faith and communication which
may have nothing to do with the overall amount of a fee. The Restate-
ment is correct when it suggests that the fundamental rationale for the
reasonable fee rules is that "[c]ourts are concerned to protect clients,
particularly those who are unsophisticated in matters of lawyers' com-
pensation, when a lawyer has overreached."'" Several states' ethical codes
suggest this point directly.H 5
If overreaching is the problem the rules are designed to avoid,
the absence of "excessive fee" cases where there is no fraud, misrepre-
sentation or other misconduct becomes readily explainable. A lawyer
who does not overreach will find it difficult to get a competent client
to agree to a fee which is disproportionate, from the client's point of
view, to the value of the services the client expects to receive. 116 Many
disciplinary cases do not turn on application of the factors, instead
imposing discipline for some identifiable act of wrongdoing, such as
lying to the client, which the court concludes renders the fee unrea-
114 RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46, cunt. at 158 (emphasis added).
115 The Texas disciplinary rules prohibit unconscionable fees, measure fairness from
the time the contact was made and evaluate unconscionability by two important factors:
"The first is overreaching by a lawyer, particularly of a client who was unusually susceptible
to such overreaching. The second is a failure of the lawyer to give at the outset a clear and
accurate explanation of how a fee was to be calculated." Carl M. Sanger, Inventing Billable
Hours: Contract u Fairness in Charging Attorney's Fees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 677 (1994)
(citing TEXAS Rutis OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.04 elms. 7 & 8); see also ALABAMA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (9) (listing as a factor "whether there is a
written fee agreement signed by the client"); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rule 4-200(B) (11) (stating factors in evaluating reasonableness
of fee include "Mlle informed consent of the client to the fee"); HAWAI'I Rubs OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (9)—(10) (listing "the relative sophistication of the lawyer
and the client; and the informed consent of the client to the fee agreement"); MAINE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.3(a) (9) (listing as a factor "[t] he informed
written consent of the client as to the fee agreement"); VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(a) ("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable and adequately ex-
plained to the client."); WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (8)
("Whether the fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client had re-
ceived a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the free agreement and of
the lawyer's billing practices.").
116 Laurence Johnson offered the hypothetical of the rich eccentric who was willing to
pay a six-figure hourly fee. See Letter from Laurence M. Johnson (Oct. 22, 1999) (on file
with the authors). Professor Gillers asks in his casebook whether a $2 billion fee in a seri-
ous criminal matter would be excessive. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 139-40 (5th ed. 1998). These examples suggest both that,
in extreme circumstances, upholding a bargained-foe fee agreement might be problematic
and that those circumstances are so unlikely to occur that the rules need not account for
them.
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sonable regardless of the result that would be reached through appli-
cation of the factors." 7
D. Overreaching and the Amount of Fees
The rationale for scrutinizing the amount of fees is to determine
whether the charges represent an abuse of trust by the lawyer taking
advantage of the client. This is essentially a question of sophistication
and information. Although bar admission requirements do restrain
clients in their choice of counsel, there are so many licensed lawyers
that for practical purposes there is no legal cartel; a client with a legal
problem and money to pay can choose to retain any among a number
of attorneys of varying costs and qualifications. 118
 Accordingly, if it is
not worth it to a particular client to hire an expensive lawyer for a
particular problem, that client does not have to do so. Because in cer-
tain respects a contract for legal services is like any other business
117 See, e.g., NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRAC-
TICE AND THE PROFESSION 267 (1996) (commenting that fees are excessive when based on
improper billing practices); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Comment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 795
(1990) (A lawyer who agrees to bill on a time-spent basis, and then pads the bill, is not
charging a 'reasonable' fee . . . ."). Professor Lisa Lerman has written several detailed stud-
ies of improper billing practices. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 8; Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to
Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REA', 661, 705-20 (1990). Cf. Kevin Hopkins, Law Firms, Technology and
the Double Billing Dilemma, 12 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 93 (1998).
1111
 See, e.g., In re Reconversion Techs., Inc., 216 B.R. 46, 57 (Bantu -. N.D. Okla. 1997)
("Sophisticated clients in today's business world will not long remain with firms who do
not trim the fat from their fee statements; the market is simply too competitive?); Geoffrey
Furlonger, Time for Business-Lawyers to Stop Billing Time?, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR,
supra note 35, at 93, 96 ("given the abundance of lawyers in the United States, if a client is
unable to negotiate what it considers to be a reasonable fee with one law firm, it presuma-
bly will negotiate a lower fee with another firm"; suggesting that a client who has been
given information and the opportunity to.negotiate, and who accepts a fee, "tacitly ac-
knowledges the reasonableness of the fee"); Richard C. Reed, How Did We Get to Where 11 7e
Are—And What Are We Going to Do About BP, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR, supra note 35,
at 3, 4-6 (noting the change in modern law practice due in part to the increase in the
numbers of lawyers); Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Mint a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20
W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 9, 19-20 (1998) (suggesting that legal marketplace is competitive);
Kenneth Lasso'', Laur,ering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV.
723, 730-31 (1994) (noting that the pool of lawyers in the United States has more than
doubled in the last 20 years to 850,000, that the ratio of lawyers to the general population
is more than twice its historical average and that there are three times as many lawyers per
capita in the United States than in any other society); Dorothy Fischer, A Glut of Lawyers in
Mercer?, MERCER Bus., Nov. 1, 1996; at 16 (asserting that attorneys nationwide have be-
come a "glut on the job market"); Jack Silica, Smaller Pool of Aspiring Lawyers, NEwsuAr,
Nov. 18, 1996, at C6 (asserting that the drop-off in applications for admission to law school
is due, in part, to the saturation of the job market for attorneys).
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contract, courts often permit lawyers and their clients leeway in their
agreements."9
At the same time, the special nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship may warrant pausing before holding that anything a partial-
. lar attorney and client agree to will be enforced. 12° The attorney
stands in a fiduciary relation to the client, 10 and there is an inherent
conflict between an attorney's desire to earn as much as possible, and
the client's desire for excellent representation at the lowest possible
cost. 122
112 See United States v. Fidelity Phila. Trust Co., 450 F.2d 771, 777 (3d Cir. 1972) (hold-
ing that if fee is fixed prior to rendering of attorney's services, a court need not inquire
into reasonableness of fees); Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61,
90 (1st Cir. 1969) (determining that prior fee arrangement must be accorded great weight
and that court's supervisory power over attorneys' fees is reserved for exceptional circum-
stances); BRUIll•ilk v. Cournoyer, 448 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D. Mass. 1978) (holding that a
court may not diminish the effectiveness of a valid contract for legal fees); jersey Land &
DCA% Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48, 54 (D.Nj. 1972) (noting that a court has "the
inherent equitable power to pass upon the reasonableness of counsel fees charged" where
a valid contract exists); Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 336 N.W.2d 886,
889-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding it inappropriate to calculate damages on a quan-
tum meruit basis where fixed fee agreement explicitly provides for agreed-upon value of
services); Wolfe v. Morgan, 524 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (determining that
bargained for attorneys' fee should be given great weight in judging reasonableness, ex-
cept where contract is unconscionable). But see, e.g., Trinkle Leeney, 650 N.E.2d 749, 754
(hid. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that measure of reasonable fee is not necessarily determined
by terms of attorney-client contract).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975); In re Smith, 572 N.E.2d
1280, 1288 (Ind. 1991); Cohen v. Radio-Electronics Officers Union. 679 A.2d 1188, 1195-
. 96 (N.J. 1996); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1978); Heinzman v. Fine, Fine,
Legum & Fine, 234 S.E.2d 282, 285-86 (Va. 1977); see also ARONSON, supra note 79, at 6
(recognizing that lawyers owe a special ethical duty to society because they represent the
means of access to the judicial system); Rati, supra note 35, at 2009 (noting that fee
arrangements between lawyers and clients are subject to public regulation and supervi-
sion).
121 See, e.g., Radio-Electronics, 679 A.2d at 1195 (noting that responsibility to regulate
conduct of attorneys extends to attorney-client fee arrangements in order to preserve
fiduciary duties attorneys owe clients); see also Lester Briclunan, Contingent Fees Without
Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 70 (1989) (noting
that the ethical duty prohibiting attorneys from charging clearly excessive fees derives
from attorneys' fiduciary obligations to clients); see generally 7 Ast. juR. 2d. Attorneys at Law
§ 137 (1997).
122 See, e.g., In re Myers, 663 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ind. 1996); see also Ross, supra note 80, at
42; WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 513; Brickman, supra note 121, at 47-48; Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 69, at 123; William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS
L. REP. 1, 24-25 (1991); Chan, supra note 35, at 621-22; Note, Discovery Abuse Under the
Federal Rules: Causes and Cult's, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 358 11.36 (1982). Indeed, Ethical Consid-
eration 2-17 of the Model Code recognizes the inherent tension between lawyers and their
clients hi charging fees:
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The question of overreaching will not always be answerable sim-
ply by looking at the objective circumstances and the amount of the
fee without also examining the client's purposes. There are many rea-
sons that a client might engage a lawyer to provide services at a cost
some might regard as unreasonable. A $500,000 bill for litigating a
$5000 claim, for example, might appear to be a clear case of mulcting
a client. Actual client problems, however, can be much more compli-
cated. Even looking at the matter strictly on financial terms, a client
may rationally conclude that a six-figure expense is justified if losing
the case could set up an adverse precedent which would cost it much
more in the long run, that the collateral estoppel or regulatory effects
of a loss could be catastrophic, or that it would be worthwhile to send
a "millions for defense, not one penny for tribute" message to a busi-
ness partner or competitor. 123
 Even non-financial considerations, such
as the reputation of an individual or business, or the sentimental, re-
ligious or moral importance of the controversy, may justify a rational
client in spending substantial sums on what appears to a third party to
be a small mattes 12•t
In a criminal case, a client also may be willing to spend a fortune
to avoid conviction on a minor crime. For some clients, acquittal may
be a matter of principle. Others may have governmental, political or
military career plans which could be destroyed by a criminal convic-
The determination of a proper fee requires consideration of the interests of
both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than a reasonable
fee, for excessive cost of legal service would deter laymen from utilizing the
legal system in protection of their rights. Furthermore, an excessive charge
abuses the professional relationship between lawyer and client. On the other
hand, adequate compensation is necessary in order to enable the lawyer to
serve his client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of
the profession.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNstnit.try EC 2-17 (1980) (footnotes omitted); see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993).
123 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 853, 857 (1992) ("From the beginning, the cigarette companies decided that they
would defend every claim, no matter what the cost, through trial and any possible appeals.
Concomitantly, the companies decided that they would, as a first line of defense, spate no
cost in exhausting their adversaries' resources short of the courthouse doo•.").
124
 An accusation of physician malpractice or an act which is morally abhorrent, such
as sexual harassment, might understandably be resisted even if the monetary amount m
controversy was relatively small.
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tion. A client may know that sonic prisoners return from even a short
sentence infected with HIV. 125
Most small legal matters will warrant nothing more than small
legal expenditures. The ethical rules and principles of agency, how-
ever, assign to the client the evaluation of the goals of the representa-
tion and the expenditures justified to achieve them. Neither courts
nor lawyers have the authority to apply their own values to measure
the importance of the case and, therefore, to dictate whether a case
will be litigated expensively or cheaply. 126
The line of cases involving sophisticated clients makes clear that
the reasonable fees rules are really aimed at preventing overreaching
by achieving its opposite, the informed consent to fees. Many cases
and the Restatement suggest that an arms-length fee agreed to by an
experienced client is reasonable per se. 127 This is not because such
fees are always reasonable based on application of the eight factors; it
is likely that many would arguably be unreasonable under the factors.
123 See, e.g., Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing
America's Most "Open" Secret, 18 YALE L. Sc. Por,'Ir, REA'. 195 (1999); David M. Siegal, Note,
Rape in Prison and AIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment Framework ofWilsoss v. Seiter, 44
STAN. L.' REV. 1541 (1992); Richard D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and AIDS in Prison: On a Colli-
sion Course to a New Death Penalty, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. Ray. 863 (1997); cf. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 843 ,(1994) (holding that prisons and jails can sometimes be liable for sexual
assaults occurring therein).
126 Cf. Committee on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107,
113 (W. Va. 1986) ("If an attorney's fee is grossly disproportionate to the services rendered
and is charged to a client who lacks fill information about all of the relevant circumstances, the
fee is 'clearly excessive' ... even though the client has consented to such fee.") (emphasis
added) (citing In re Kennedy, 472 A.2c1 1317, 1322, 1330-31 (Del. 1984) (involving attor-
ney who, among other misconduct, charged contingent fee when there was no contin-
gency)).
127 See supra note 77. Another example is In re Potts, 718 P.2t1 1363. 1372 (Or. 1986),
where the court found that lawyers had, among other misconduct, charged an excessive
fee of $9000 for alleged legal services, unsupported by time records and which included
services to the client such as car repairs and personal advice. The client had asked earlier
about what the fee would be but received no answer from counsel. See id. at 1366-67. The
court closed the opinion with a reminder not that fees should be reasonable, but rather
that "[ndaking certain that an early clear understanding regarding fees is reached with the
client aids the attorney-client relationship and lets the client know what to expect." Id. at
1372. Once again, the problem was not the size of the fee per se, but client communica-
tion and agreement about what services would be performed and at what price. See id. For
this reason, other courts have been critical of attorneys who unilaterally set fees late in the
case, creating a situation where the client has no opportunity to elect to retain a different
lawyer, negotiate a lower fee or forego a legal solution to the matter. See, e.g., Muskingum
Bar Ass'n v. Tanner, 278 N.E.2d 21 (Ohio 1972); In re Kinast, 357 N.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Wis.
1984); see also Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Craves, 556 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Ky. 1977) (charging
overhead expenses and extravagant meals to client warranted discipline, "especially in the
absence of a specific agreement with respect to those particular expenses").
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Rather, such fees are deemed reasonable because the clients knew
what they wanted and bargained for it. Similarly, courts often mention
the ignorance of clients in holding fees to be unreasonable. 128 The
Restatement confirms the idea that what fee regulation is aimed at is
the process by which the fee was set. 129
II. THE CRIMINAL FEE CASES
The purpose of the reasonable fee rules is to prevent overreach-
ing and these rules are applied in cases where the client has in fact
been overreached. If this is the case, then what is the problem?
One problem is underachievement of the goals of the rule. The
mismatch between the purpose and the text means that the majority
of lawyers who want to be fair and honest in dealing with their clients
receive insufficient guidance. By suggesting that what is at stake is
substantive reasonableness, when it is really communication, the rules
miss an opportunity to educate lawyers about desirable behavior.
There are undoubtedly many surprised and angry clients in the gap
between full communication and the level of overreaching which
would warrant discipline. 130
128 See, e.g., Dunn v. H.K Porter Co„ 78 F.R.D. 41, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (refusing to ap-
prove class action fee award; "absent a showing that the clients were sophisticated com-
mercial persons who were aware of the consequences of their decisions, we find this fee
excessive"), rev 'd on other grounds, 602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir. 1979).
129 The Restatement explained that the first question was:
when the agreement was made, did the lawyer afford the client a free and in-
formed choice? Relevant circumstances include whether the client was so-
phisticated in entering into such arrangements, whether the client was a
fiduciary whose beneficiary deserves special protection, whether the client
had a reasonable opportunity to seek another lawyer, whether the lawyer ade-
quately explained the probable cost and other implications of the proposed
fee agreement ... whether the client understood the alternatives available
from this lawyer and others, and whether the lawyer explained the benefits
and drawbacks of the proposed legal services without misleading intimations.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46, ant. at 159-60.
13° As Professor Selinger noted, for example:
[TI he ethics rules that govern lawyers' fees have never really made clear to
what extent the propriety of a fee charged to a client should be evaluated ac-
cording to contract/free market principles and to what extent according to
principles of fairness. The upshot of this uncertainty has been, I fear, that
some lawyers have felt free to use fairness arguments to excuse blatant con-
tractual violations and others to use contract arguments to excuse a lot of un-
fairness.
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Another form of harm comes from overenforcement. In a pair of
remarkable and influential cases, lawyers handling criminal cases were
disciplined by distinguished state supreme courts for charging exces-
sive fees. 151 These cases suggest that the rules hold out the prospect of
serious harm to the interests of clients.
The cases are troubling for two reasons. First, application of the
eight-factor test does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the
fees were excessive; to the contrary, there is a strong argument that
they were reasonable. Second, application of the unreasonable fee
rule in routine criminal cases may tend to make high quality counsel
less available because lawyers will know that if they want to be able to
charge what the market will bear, they must practice in a different
field.
A. In re Fordham
In 1996, in In re Fordharn, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court publicly censured an attorney for charging a "clearly excessive
fee" in violation of Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07, DR 2-106, 152
The highly publicized case arose out of the prosecution of defendant
and client Timothy Clark for operating a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol ("OUI".) and other charges. 133 There, Clark had
Selinger, supra note 115, at 672; see also HAZARD, supra note 81, at 98 (noting that the
"Code's formula provides sustaining authority" for high fee awards in a patronage system);
John M.A. DiPippa, Lawyers, Clients, and Money, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK U. 95, 119 (1995)
("Using the reasonableness or clearly excessive standard does not adequately protect the
client's interests and allows lawyers to engage in what amounts to misrepresentation" in
the context of non-refundable fees, areas where such practices are common); Watson,
supra note 80, at 195 (noting that code factors, "particularly the amount customarily
charged, undoubtedly will encourage double-billing and padding in areas where it is al-
ready the custom to do so"); Chan, supra note 35, at 619 (noting that malleability of factors
means that there are "many different ways to justify different overbilling practices as rea-
sonable using the factors").
131 See In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997);
In re Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. 1979).
132 See 668 N.E.2d at 825. S.J.C. Rule 3:07, DR 2-106, was identical to DR 2-106 of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-106 (1983).
133 See Associated Press, Lawyer Gets Censured for Working Too Long on Case, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 1996, at 6A; Gail Diane Cox, Fie on Fees: Excessive Fees are Attacked
Across the Board, NAT'L 14, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al; Cornelia Wallis Honchar, Decisions Cast a
Shadow Over CLE Talks, Legal Fees, Cm. DAtts L. BULL., Oct. 4, 1996, at 6; Maria Shao, SIC
Disciplines Attorney , for Excessive Fees, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 1996, at Dl; Loren Singer,
Massachusetts Lawyer Sanctioned for Billing Too Many Hours of Actual Work, WEST'S LEGAL
NEWS, Aug. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 461297; David L. Yas, Attorney Disciplined for Ex-
cessive' DUI Fee; Bill for Handling Routine' Case Topped $50A,' MASS. LAW. Witt.v., Aug. 19,
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been stopped by the Acton, Massachusetts police in March 1989, who
found a half-empty quart of vodka in his car. 134 Clark, who admitted
that he had been drinking, 135 failed a field sobriety test and then reg-
istered a 0.10 and a 0.12 on the Breathalyzer machine at the police
stationhouse, exceeding the statutory limit.'"
Recognizing that they faced a strong prosecution case, Clark and
his family interviewed a number of attorneys, who explained that the
case was not promising, that Clark should plead guilty and that they
would do what they could for a flat fee of three to ten thousand dol-
lars.137 Clark was unwilling to plead guilty. 138
Clark's father met.Fordham when he installed a burglar alarm in
Fordham's house. 139 After some discussion, Fordham offered the serv-
ices of his own small firm. 14° Fordham discussed the fees for his serv-
ices at the first meeting, making clear that he would bill at an hourly
rate rather than charging a flat fee.Ht Fordham also explained that he
had never represented a client in an OUI case or in any criminal case
1996, at 1; David L. Yas, Some Lawyers Say Flat Fees Preferable in Criminal Cases, MASS. LAW.
WKLY., Sept. 9,1996, at Al.
134 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 818.
133 See Brief of Respondent at 3, In re Fordhant, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) (No. SJC
06951).
136 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 818.
117 See id.; Petition for Certiorari at 54a, Fordham v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 519
U.S. 1149 (1997) (No. 96-946) (reprinting hearing committee's finding of fact that client
"did not want to plead guilty ... even though he had been advised to do so by the other
attorneys they consulted before Fordham.").
138 See Ford ham, 668 N.E.2d at 820.
139 See id. at 818-19.
1" See id. at 819.
"1 See id. at 819. There is some dispute as to whether Fordhant actually quoted an
hourly rate at his first meeting. According to the Brief of the Bar Counsel, Clark's father
testified that Fordham told him that his rate was $200 per hour for his time and $100 per
hour for the time of his associates. See Brief of the Bar Counsel at 5, In re Fordham, 668
N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) (No. SJC 06951). Fordhant testified, however, that he did not
state a per hour rate because he did not know what his rate would be. See id. But see Associ-
ated Press, supra note 133, at GA (indicating that according to Clark's father, Fordham told
hint that the total cost for the case would be between $5000 and $7000). "Flat rate" billing
entails an agreement between the attorney and the client for a single fee for services ren-
dered, regardless of the actual amount of tune that the attorney spends on the case. See
Tolman, supra note 82, at 69. In addition to fiat-rate and hourly billing there are several
other methods by which attorneys may bill their clients. See id. For example, attorneys may
bill on an "equity basis," by which the attorney calculates the fees at the end of the repre-
sentation pursuant to the eight factors outlined in the Model Code and the Model Rules. See
id. An attorney may also bill on.a "cost-plus" basis, in which the attorney bills based on his
overhead costs, plus a reasonable profit: See id. Under the "punitive" billing method, the
attorney bills in an amount that, in effect, punishes the client for repeatedly engaging in
activity that the lawyer advises the client to avoid. See id.
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for that matter, that he had never tried a case in the state district court
system 142 and that he would need to undertake a great deal of work to
prepare for the case. 143 He also said that he was experienced, hard-
working and, according to Clark's father, stated that he charged $200
per hour.l'14 The Clarks, for their part, made clear that they would not
consider a guilty plea.145 The Clarks chose Fordham because of Ford-
ham's reputation and credentials. 146
As he promised, Fordham proved to be hard-working. He and his
associates worked 227 hours on the case and billed the client more
than $50,000. 147 Fordham and the disciplinary prosecutor stipulated
that the hours billed actually represented the amount of time spent
on the case,148 and that "Fordham acted conscientiously, diligently,
and in good faith in representing Timothy and in his billing in [the]
case. "149
During the course of his representation, Fordham filed four pre-
trial motions on Clark's behalf.'" The district court allowed two of the
four motions, one of which was described as presenting "a creative, if
not novel, approach." 151 The novel motion sought suppression of the
results of the Breathalyzer tests,152 based on a regulation which
deemed Breathalyzer tests inadmissible unless they were "within" 0.02
of each other. Fordham produced a memorandum, supported by the
affidavit of a mathematician, that a difference of 0.02 was not "within"
0.02. 153 The motion was granted, the Breathalyzer results suppressed,
the case was tried and Clark was found not guilty. 154
Fordham billed Clark five times during the seven months the
case was pending.'" Clark's father paid Fordham a total of $10,000,
but refused to make any additional payments, 156 After his acquittal,
142 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 819.
1" See Associated Press, supra note 133, at 6A.
144 See supra note 141.
145 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 820-21.
146 See id. at 819.
147 See id.
146 SSe id.
149 „rd,
15° See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 819.
151 See id. at 819, 821-22 (quoting findings of the hearing committee).
159 See id. at 819.
153 See id. (citing MASS. RECS. CODE tit. 501, § 2.56(2) (1994)).
154 see id,
155 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 819.
156 See id.
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the ungrateful Clark family filed a complaint with the Board of Bar
Overseers ("Board") concerning Fordham's fee.'"
What made this lawyer think he could spend this kind of time on
a loser of a case? Even the court acknowledged that . Fordham was a
"seasoned and well-respected" Boston attorney with "impressive cre-
dentials.'158
 In fact, Fordham was a magna cum laude graduate of Har-
vard Law School, where he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review, a
Supreme Court clerk and former managing partner at Foley, Hoag &
Eliot, a leading Boston law firm. 159
 A member of the American Law
Institute, ironically, he sat on the Massachusetts Bar Association's
Committee on Professional Ethics and taught professional responsi-
bility at Harvard Law Schoo1. 16°
Complaints against lawyers in Massachusetts are prosecuted be-
fore the Board by the Office of Bar Counsel. The chair of the Board
dismissed Bar Counsel's petition for discipline against Fordham which
alleged that Fordham violated DR 2-106. 161
 After Bar Counsel ap-
pealed, the full Board referred the matter to a' hearing committee,
which recommended against discipline. 162
 The full Board accepted
the recommendation and dismissed the petition. 163
 Bar counsel again
appealed, this time to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 164
The Supreme Judicial Court found that the Board erred in de-
termining that Fordham's fee was not clearly excessive. 165 The court
examined the factors listed in DR 2-106(B), 166 addressing, first, factor
one, which requires examining "[t]he time and labor required, the
157 See Associated Press, supra note 133, at 6A.
158
 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 819-20.
159
 SeeASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 297 (1977).
188 See id.
161
 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 818.
162 see id.
165 See id. The Board dismissed the petition based on several factors. First, the Board
noted that "[b]ar counsel and Fordhant stipulated that Fordhant acted conscientiously,
diligently, and in good faith in his representation of the client and in his billing on the
case." Id. at 820. Further, the Board noted that although Fordham lacked experience in
criminal cases and spent over 200 hours on the case, in part to educate himself on the law
of OU1 defense, Fordham was a "seasoned and well-respected civil lawyer." Id. The Board
also noted that Clark entered into the fee arrangement with "open eyes" after consulting
with lawyers with more experience in OUI defense. See id. Finally, the Board found that the
Clarks were not interested in considering a plea, and that they ultimately received au ac-
quittal for Timothy. See id. at 820-21.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 821.
166 See supra note 75 and accompanying text for the eight factors listed in the Model
Code and the Model Rules.
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novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite
to perform the legal service properly." 167 Based upon the testimony of
four expert OUI witnesses,168 the court determined that "the number
of hours devoted to Timothy's OUI case by Fordham and his associ-
ates was substantially in excess of the hours that a prudent experi-
enced lawyer would have spent" and could not be justified. 168 Moreo-
ver, the court found that Fordhant's inexperience with criminal
defense matters could not justify the amount charged. 1" The court
cited EC 6-3 as a guiding principle that "a lawyer generally should not
accept employment in any area of the law in which he is not
qualified."171
10 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 821; see also SJ.C. RULE 3:07, DR 2-106(B) (1).
168 The hearing committee considered the testimony of 10 expert witnesses, six of
whom submitted statements in the form of affidavits and four of whom appeared in person
to testify before the committee. See Respondent's Brief at 6, Fordham (No. SJC 06951). The
Supreme Judicial Court addressed only the testimony of the four experts who testified in
person before the committee. See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 821-22. Two of those experts
were called by bar counsel and two were called by the respondent. See id. The court noted
that the two experts called by Fordham testified that the fee charged was not clearly exces-
sive. See id. at 822. One of the experts, however, testified that he had never spent more
than 40 hours on an OU1 case. See id. The 'other testified that she may have known of a
case in which the attorney spent close to 100 hours, but in any event, she had never heard
of an attorney charging a fee in excess of $10,000 for a bench trial. See id. Both attorneys
indicated that the circumstances of the case were not unusual, but that the theory that
Fordham employed for the suppression of the Breathalyzer tests was novel. See id. The
experts for bar counsel both indicated that the circumstances of the case were not difficult
or unusual, and that the fee charged by Fordham was excessive. See id. at 821. Bar counsel's
experts did testify, however, that Fordhanes theory for the suppression of Breathalyzer
results was novel, justifying more time, but not justifying nearly the time charged by Ford-
ham. See id.
169 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 822.
170 See id. at 822-23 (citing In re Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1985)).
ill Id. at 823 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-3 (1983)).
Although Ethical Consideration 6-3 suggests that "a lawyer generally should not accept
employment in any area of the law in which he is not qualified," the Ethical Consideration
makes clear that the attorney "may accept such employment if in good faith he expects to
become qualified through study and investigation, as long as such preparation would not .
result in unreasonable delay or expense to his Client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sPoNstsurrY EC 6-3(1983); see id. DR 6-101(A) (1) (1983) (prohibiting an attorney from
handling "a legal Matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to han-
dle"); see also Larson, 694 P.2d at 1059 ("[C]lients should not be expected to pay for the
education of a lawyer when he spends excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with rea-
sonable experience, become matters of routine."). There was no indication that the court
considered Fordham to have violated DR 6-,101(A) (1) by undertaking the representation.
The court merely used the Ethical Consideration as guidance in determining that Ford-
ham's inexperience could not justify the high fee charged to Clark. See Fordham, 668
N.E.2d at 822-23.
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The court next compared the fee charged with the fees custom-
arily charged in the locality for the same or similar services. 172
 The
court determined that the hearing committee failed to make any
finding with regard to this factor. 173
 Based on the testimony of the ex-
pert witnesses, the court determined that the fees for services in OUI
cases ranged from $1000 to $35,000. 174
Filially, the court rejected the hearing committee's findings that
the fee was not clearly excessive because Clark entered into the
agreement with "open eyes," the fee fell within a "safe harbor" and
Clark acquiesced in the fee by not strenuously objecting to the bills.
Despite the fact that Clark was made fully aware of Fordham's lack of
experience and need to "become familiar with the law in that area,"
and although Clark had the opportunity to interview other attorneys
who were experts in OUI defense, the court determined that other
factors were more significant. 178
 For example, the court emphasized
that the hearing committee found that "Clark did not appear to have
understood in any real sense the implications of choosing Ford-
ham."178
 Moreover, "Fordham did not give Clark any estimate of the
total expected fee or the number of $200 hours that would be re-
quired."'" Thus, the court determined that Clark did not enter into
the arrangement with "open eyes."178
Critically, the court held that client consent was irrelevant to the
question of whether the fee was reasonable. 179
 "Bar counsel notes, and
we agree, that ' test as stated in . . . DR 2-106(A) is whether the
fee "charged" is clearly excessive, not whether the fee is accepted as
valid or acquiesced in by the client." 189
172 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 822-23; see also S.C. RULE 3:07, DR 2-106(B) (3).
173 See Fordhain, 668 N.E.2d at 823.
174
 See id. One of the witnesses testified that customary flat fees in OUI defense cases
ranged from $1000 to $7500, and that he had never before heard of a fee in excess of
$15,000. See id. Another witness testified that the customary fee ran from $1500 to $5000,
and that he had never seen a fee over $10,000 for an OUI bench trial. See id. A third wit-
ness testified that Fordham's fee was higher than any fee that she had ever encountered
for similar services, that $10,000 was the highest fee she had ever heard of (through a
"rumor") and that the average fee for an OUI bench u
-ial was about $2000. See id. The final
witness testified that he had heard of $35,000 fees for defending OUI charges. See id.
175 See id. (quoting findings of the hearing committee).
175 Id. (quoting findings of the hearing committee).
177 Id. (quoting findings of the hearing committee).
178 See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 823-24.
179 See id. at 824.
18° Id. at 824.
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If Fordham had been up on the latest Massachusetts cases, he
might have thought he had little to worry about—just a few years be-
fore, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to interfere with a $975,000
fee in an "open and shut" personal injury suit. 181 In that case, the
plaintiff's injury was catastrophic, liability undisputed and the defen-
dant, Browning-Ferris Industries, financially capable of satisfying a
judgment of any amount. The law conditioned a fee award on court
approval, and the trial court refused to sanction a seven figure fee
when the $3,000,000 settlement had been achieved quickly; $695,000,
it said, was more appropriate. 182 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed,
holding that a negotiated fee was not subject to judicial interfer-
ence. 183 Notwithstanding this precedent, Fordham found himself
sanctioned.'"
B. In re Kutner
In In re Kutne4 185 the Illinois Supreme Court publicly censured an
attorney for charging an excessive fee. Kutner involved facts somewhat
similar to those in' Fordharn. 186 Mr. Kutner agreed to consult with Wil-
liam Fisher, who had been charged with battery by his sister-in-law on
August 14, 1973.187 Fisher had a special interest in hiring Kutner; ap-
parently, Fisher's mother was aware of Kutner's reputation. 188 Fisher
consulted with Kutner on August 28, 1973, for a $250 fee. 189 Kutner
explained that he would charge a $5000 fee, in advance, for the whole
case. 190 This was more than Fisher could afford to pay. 191 A few days
later, however, Fisher managed to borrow the money and Kutner took
181 See Gagnon v Shoblom, No. 88-2105 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampden Co., Feb. 20,
1990), read, 565 N.E.2d 775 (Mass. 1991); see generally Lester Briclonan, A Massachusetts
Debacle: Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1417 (1991).
in See Gagnon, 565 N.E.2d at 776.
183 See id. at 777.
I" See Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 825; see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Brink, 361 N.E.2d
406, 411-12 (Mass. 1977) (upholding fee based on success of litigation which was more
than seven times what hourly charges would have been, in spite of the absence of fee
agreement); Rubin v. Taylor, 294 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Mass. App. 1973) (upholding large
hourly fee in spite of limited success where lawyer warned client of possibility of lack of
success and client decided to proceed).
1" 399 N.E.2d 963 (111. 1979).
116 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 964.
189 See id.
190 See Kutner; 399 N.E.2d at 964.
191 See id.
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the case. 192 Kutner sent a colleague to attend a preliminary court
date. 193 In court, the sister-in-law appeared and asked the judge to
drop the charges, and the judge obliged. 194
Fisher regretted paying so much and sought to recover part of his
fee, but Kutner declined.'" A hearing board evaluating a complaint
by the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion("ARDC") recommended that the complaint be dismissed, but
the Review Board disagreed, as did the Illinois Supreme Court, and
Kutner was found liable for charging an excessive fee.' 96 The ARDC's
expert proposed that a fee of $750 to $1250 would have been reason-
able, that it was the custom to return a portion of the fee if the case
was disposed of early and that the case was not particularly com-
plex. 197
Justice Clark dissented:
While it is our duty to scrutinize lawyer-client dealings where
an injustice has been done, I do not think we should pierce
the veil of lawyer-client relations where no fraud or other
wrongdoing has been shown. A client who voluntarily agrees
to pay what he thinks a lawyer's services are worth should
not be heard to complain when, after the lawyer has begun
to prepare the case, the charges are dismissed. My opinion
might be different had coercion, overreaching or deception
been shown here. But those elements simply are not pres-
ent.'"
The problem, according to Justice Clark, is that the value of legal serv-
ices is difficult to measure.'" "The majority has engaged in a subjec-
tive process by which it places an arbitrary value on legal services ..
its opinion says that a lawyer can voluntarily enter into an agreement
with a client, based on the mutual agreement of the parties as to the
worth of 'attorney's services, only to be second-guessed later on."200
Accordingly, the question should be left to individual clients."' "The
192 See id.
1" See id.
194
 See id.
1 " See Kutner, 399 N.E.2d at 964.
196 see id.
197 See id. at 966.
198 Id. at 967 (Clark, J., dissenting).
199 See id.
200
 Kutner, 399 N.E.2d at 967 (Clark, J., dissenting).
401 See id.
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negotiation of a fee should be left to the parties. A person may be will-
ing to pay more for the services of a particular attorney at a particular
time, when, however, under different circumstances, the attorney's
time would not be as valuable."2°2
Just as in the Fordham case, there are reasons why a rational client
would be willing to pay a premium price for the services of an attor-
ney. Indeed, Kutner's record may be even more distinguished than
Fordham's. Kutner entered the University of Chicago at fifteen years
of age, clerked for Clarence Darrow, studied under Harold Lasswell
and received his law degree at age twenty-one. 203 He is credited with
winning the release of more than 1000 prisoners around the world in
the course of his career,204 including an African-American man who
spent twenty years in prison after being framed for rape by the Ku
Klux Klan.205 A one-time member of the faculty at Yale Law School, 206
Kutner wrote numerous books and articles about various aspects of
law,207 and represented notables including Ernest Hemingway, Pope
Pius XII, the Dalai Lama, Ezra Pound, and Cardinal Joseph Mind-
szenty, prisoner of the Hungarian Communist regime. 208 Kutner was
nominated several times for a Nobel Peace prize and co-founded Am-
nesty lnternational.20 He also developed the concept of the living
will.21 °
C. Were the Fees Unreasonable?
In Kutner and Fordham, the decisionmakers themselves were di-
vided on whether any impropriety had occurred, suggesting that these
2°2 Id. at 968.
203 See Charles McWhinnie, Luis Kutner, 84; Lawyer Fought for Human Rights, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at 66; Obituary, CHI. DAILY L. Bum..., Mar. 3, 1993, at 1.
204 See Obituary, supra note 203, at 1.
203 See United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Rage'', 86 F. Supp. 382, 390-91 (N.D. Ill.
1949).
2°8 See ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 153 (1949).
207 See, e.g., THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: A SYMPOSIUM ON WORLD
HABEAS CORPUS (Luis Kutner ed., 1970) (contributors included Justices Brennan and
Douglas).
208 See McWhinnie, supra note 203, at 66.
209 See Obituary, supra note 203, at 1.
210 See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. Cm, L. REV.
803, 808 11.23 (1993) (citing Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Pro-
posal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969) as "the genesis of the living will idea").
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were close cases.211
 Indeed, it is not difficult to apply the factors and
reach the conclusion that the fees were entirely justified, at least as-
suming that the reputation and freedom of the defendants were
highly valuable.
In both cases, factor four, the amount involved and the results
obtained, weighs in the lawyers' favor. The result was a complete vic-
tory for both clients on the criminal charges. If the amount involved
is read as the importance of the case, then what is at stake is being
deemed a criminal, a circumstance which could have significant
financial, social, emotional and physical consequences for the clients.
Additionally, factor seven, the experience, reputation and ability of
the lawyer performing the services, justifies a high fee. It is hard to
imagine two lawyers with better credentials and experience, if not
necessarily in criminal law, at least in high-stakes litigation. Further-
more, factor three, the fee customarily charged in the locality for simi-
lar services, weighs in favor of the lawyers if the "similar services" are
excellent litigation assistance in large, high-cost cities like Boston and
Chicago. In that instance, the fees are entirely reasonable.
Factor one, the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the legal questions involved and the skill requisite to per-
form the legal services properly, also arguably weighs in Fordham's
favor, given that it was necessary for Fordham to investigate an area of
law which had not received the kind of expert scrutiny he proposed to
put into it. 212
 Factor one does not cut in Kutner's favor to the same
extent. Kutner, however, was working on the basis of a flat fee. In this
way Kutner's conduct is supported by the Restatement, which . explains
that the reasonableness of the fee must be evaluated in light of the
agreement and expectations of the parties, including their allocation
of risk. "A contingent-fee agreement ... allocates to the lawyer the
risk that the case will require much time and produce no recovery
and to the client the risk that the case will require little time and pro-
duce a substantial recovery. Events within that range of risks, such as a
high recovery, do not make unreasonable an agreement that was rea-
sonable when made."213
 Similarly, a flat fee allocates to the lawyer the
risk that the case will take much time, in exchange for a sum certain,
211 Cf. Attorney Grievance Co/lien v. Wright, 507 A.2d 618, 620 (Md. 1986) (holding
that the prosecution failed to satisfy its burden of proof because six experts were evenly
divided over whether fee was reasonable).
212 See In re Fordhani, 668 N.E.2d 816, 821-22 (Mass. 1996).
213 RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 46, mt. at 161.
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and allocates to the client the risk that the case will take little time, in
exchange for assurance of representation for the entirety of the case.
This conclusion is supported by the Illustration to Section 46,
which involves "Bank Clerk," charged with embezzlement, repre-
sented by "Lawyer" for a flat $15,000 fee. If "[t] he next day another
employee confesses to having taken the money, and the prosecutor
(not knowing of Lawyer's retention by Bank Clerk) immediately drops
the charges against Bank Clerk," some refund is due.214 On the other
hand, the mere fact that the case settles quickly pursuant to a guilty
plea "would not render unreasonable an otherwise proper $15,000
flat fee. A negotiated disposition without trial is a common event that
parties are assumed to contemplate when they agree that the lawyer
will receive a flat fee."215 In short, among the various permitted sys-
tems of charging are hourly, contingent and flat fees. They are ac-
ceptable if fair when made, unless - some unexpected event vitiates the
agreement. Just as the lawyer is not permitted to look back from the
conclusion of the representation and say "I wish I had charged by the
method which gave me the greatest recovery," the client may not in-
214 1d.
.	 215 Id. at 162. Of course, the illustration involves a settlement achieved by Lawyer on
behalf of Bank Clerk, and, although in Kutner it is possible that the judge dismissed the
case, and the prosecutor did not appeal, partly or entirely because a distinguished lawyer
like Kutner was on the case, it is by no means certain. On the other hand, in the Restate-
ment's illustration, it may well be that a more inexpensive lawyer or bank clerk acting alone
could have achieved the same deal, yet the lack of evidence of causation does not vitiate
the entitlement to the fee. Perhaps it is for this reason that the first example in the illustra-
tion relies on the fact that the prosecutor dropped the charges without knowing of Law-
yer's retention by Bank Clerk to support the conclusion that Lawyer is due no fee. Once a
lawyer formally becomes involved, it is always'possible that the result is due, in part, to that
involvement. This, indeed, was a foundation of Kutner's defense, that his client wanted to
make the case go away by hiring a distinguished lawyer. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 3,
In to Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963(No. 51608) (noting that Kutner's "prestige and commitment
to a jury trial would be conveyed to the Complainant through [the client's] brother; and
undoubtedly this would dissuade her from pressing the assault and battery case, which is
precisely what happened"); id. at 5 (stating that the client Insisted that he wanted [Kut-
ner] to impress his sister-in-law so she would dismiss the Complaint, which is what actually
happened").
It also must be acknowledged that both Fordham and Kutner involved client cam-
plaint's. Client grievances are common in criminal cases, probably because when clients
lose, they are understandably reluctant to pay even for excellent services, and when they
win, they find it hard to understand why they should pay for avoiding having an injustice
visited upon them. Therefore, the fact that both clients wish they could have paid less for
their victories is not necessarily dispositive. cf. MICHAEL DORMAN, KING OF THE COURT-
ROOM 213 (1969) (noting that clients' "gratitude ....[o]ften ... fades within hours of the
jury's pronouncement of the words 'not guilty.").
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sist that the only reasonable billing method is the one which, from
hindsight, results in the lowest charge. 216
D. Class Structure in the Bar: Criminal Lawyers
In Kutner and Fordham, the clients were aware of available, less
expensive alternatives. The courts seem to have said that the clients
had no choice but to take them, or at least that Kutner and Fordham
should not have charged much more than the cheap lawyers on pain
of discipline. The major conceptual flaw in the opinions is that they
fail to recognize that lawyers differ in ability, that better lawyers can
sometimes achieve better results, and that better lawyers sometimes
cost more than average ones.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected virtually every
premise upon which the Kutner and Fordhant decisions rest. It could be
argued that there was no need to hire leading lawyers, because aver-
age lawyers would have done just as well. In 1963, the Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright answered this by explaining that "there are few defen-
dants charged with crone, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers
they can get to prepare and present their defenses." 217
 Of course, the
best lawyer is not always the most expensive. Yet, the Supreme Court
in 1989 in Cap/in & Drysdale v. United States recognized that "the qual-
ity of a criminal defendant's representation frequently may turn on
his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy." 218 Therefore, the
idea that there is some relationship between the amount the lawyer is
216 The Illinois Supreme Court in Kutner dismissed out of hand Kutner's appeal to "the
law of fixed fees" by pointing out that "the time required to perform a legal task is a fac-
tor." 399 N.E.2d at 966. Thus, the court seemed to suggest that there was no difference for
purposes of reasonableness analysis between a fee calculated on an hourly rate or one
based on a flat fee. If flat fees are to be permitted at all, this cannot be correct. Indeed, in
a later case, the court acknowledged that the fact that the fee in Kutner was calculated
based on flat rate, among other circumstances, justified the minimal punishment Kutner
received. See ht re Gerard, 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1064 (Ill. 1989).
217
 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
218
 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in the result)); see also, e.g., JAMES W. COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE:
THE SOCIOLOGY OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 178 (3d ed. 1994) Many former defendants
have openly admitted that their ability to 'hire the best' was the decisive factor in their
case. . ."); Jorge L. Cairo & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes of Limita-
tions and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone Too Far?, 23 PEPP.
L. REV. 1239, 1266 (1996) (asserting that in some cases, 'who wins may be determined
only by who hires the best attorney(s)"); Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh, Questioning the Cultural
and Gender-Based Assumptions of the Adversary System: 11:nces of Asian-American Law Students, 7
BERK. WOMEN'S L.J. 125, 164 (1992) (noting criticism that the justice system is "sta[clked
in favor of the people who have the most assets, who can hire the best attorney").
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being paid and the quality of the representation, though certainly not
true in every case,219 is well recognized.
The courts in Fordham and Kutner insisted that the cases were rou-
tine.22° Arguably, the routine nature of the actions should limit the
permissible fee. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that a
relatively small penalty does not necessarily mean that the legal issues
in the case are simple. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,221 the Court recog-
nized a right to counsel even in misdemeanor cases where imprison-
ment was possible, rejecting the notion that counsel was unnecessary
in cases likely to be simple.222
We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprison-
ment even for a brief period are any less complex than when
a person can be sent off for six months or more. . . . The trial
of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief sentences of
imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often bristle with
thorny constitutional questions.223
Many cases are intrinsically neither routine nor complex; much de-
pends on whether the lawyers involved find the complexities and nov-
elties which turn a routine loser into a viable case. 224 Of course, an
OUI, an assault or even a drug trafficking charge may well be viewed
as routine from the perspective of a trial or appellate judge who par-
ticipates in disposing of dozens or hundreds of such cases per year.
219 For example, indigent criminal defendants represented without charge by the Pub-
lic Defender Service of Washington, D.C. or the Legal Aid Society of New York, or civil
rights litigants represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund or the
Southern Center for Human Rights may well receive service of a quality difficult to dupli-
cate in the market.
22° See Kutner, 399 N.E.2c1 at 966; in re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816, 821 (Mass. 1996)
(crediting testimony that there were "no unusual circumstances" in the case).
221 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
222 See id. at 33.
223. id. (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
224 Many United States Supreme Court cases have involved "routine" misdemeanor
convictions. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States. 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (inicounselled misde-
meanor conviction can be used to increase punishment at subsequent trial); United States
v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (misdemeanor fine did not violate constitutional
requirement that revenue-raising bills originate in the House of Representatives); Butter-
worth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (misdemeanor statute prohibiting disclosure of public
records unconstitutional); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (disenfranchise-
ment for misdemeanor offense of moral turpitude unconstitutional under the circum-
stances); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (misdemeanor conviction for abandoning
children did not unconstitutionally infringe right to travel).
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The fact that .the system treats some kinds of criminal cases as routine
does not mean that it is either strategic or mandatory for defendants
and their attorneys to do the same. 225
The Supreme Court is correct in the assertion that the quality of
lawyering makes a difference. Many courts have recognized that
"[1]awyers are not fungible. "226
 Those in the best position to know, law
firms and sophisticated individuals, are willing to pay premium prices
to hire firms such as Covington & Burling, or Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, or Foley, Hoag & Eliot; those. firms in turn willingly
pay premium prices to hire the individual attorneys they deem most
promising, even though in both instances there are cheaper alterna-
tives. As Professor Hazard put it, "in high level law practice relatively
small differences in competence can make a substantial difference in
the results achieved for a client, just as small differences in ability
make a big difference in result in competitive sports."227 Part of the
difference may be "snob appeal," and some clients may irrationally
pay more than necessar y.228
 A large part of the explanation, however,
225
 See, e.g., JAY G. FOONBERG, FINDING THE RIGHT LAWYER 201 (1995) ("All criminal
accusations should be takeit most seriously.").
226
 Barham v. State, 641 N.E.2d 79, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); see also Robins v. United
States, 404 U.S. 1049, 1052 (1972) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas & Marshall,jf., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1986)
(relying on notion the that "lawyers are not Tungible'" to support conclusion that refusal
to grant continuance violated defendant's right to counsel); Boulas v. Superior Court, 233
Cal. Rptr. 487, 491 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting that "f cJriminal defense lawyers are not fungi-
ble").
227
 HAZARD, supra note 81, at 102; see also FOONBERG, supra note 225, at 115; ROBERT L.
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER 143 (1988) ("Much of the associate's work, such as re-
search, drafting, and reviewing documents, requires general skills and intelligence. Yet
there is enormous variation in the quality with which those tasks are performed ....").
228 See ARONSON, supra note 79, at 4; Lionel R. Barrett, The Ten Commandments of Setting
and Collecting Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 1983, at 3, quoted in
HALL, supra note 96, § 7:2, at 157. In the hiring context, at one time gender, race, appear-
ance and social background mattered as much or more than academic record and ability.
See S. S. Samuelson & L. Fahey, Strategic Planning for Law Firms: The Application of Manage-
ment Theory, 52 U.. PITT. L. REV. 435, 445 (1991). Studies have indicated that clients, or
potential clients, do not seek out attorneys based on the cost of their services. Clients
choose attorneys based on their perceptions of the attorney's competence and on their
perceptions of the attorney's interest in their case. Clients want the best attorney's that they
can afford, not the least expensive. See ABA SEC. OF CRIM. JUST., Exploring the Labyrinth of
Fee Setting, in How TO SET AND COLLECT ATTORNEY FEES IN CRIMINAL CASES 13, 14 (1985).
Moreover, as illustrated by Professor Jethro Lieberman in his book Crisis at the Bar, this sort
of counterintuitive rationale may often be taken a step further in order to justify, in the
minds of both attorneys and their clients, fees that seem unrelated to value. See LIEBER-
MAN, supra note 82, at 107-08. Lieberman notes a story discussed in Joseph Goulden's The
Superlawyers. See JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS 100-02 (1972). According to
Goulden's story, in 1959 the Revlon Corporation was under investigation as a sponsor of
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is that good "[I] egal services cost a lot because good legal services are
in high demand and limited supply." 229
Excellence does not necessarily mean having a great deal of ex-
perience in a particular area of the law. Of course the ideal lawyer is
one who is exceedingly brilliant and specializes in handling precisely
the type of matter in the very court where the action is pending. If
this lawyer is unavailable, few sensible clients would choose an experi-
enced plodder over the brilliant generalist; it is widely recognized that
the most important factor which makes a lawyer excellent is good
judgment.23° As the Comments to the Model Rules explain: "Perhaps
the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of
legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily tran-
scends any particular specialized knowledge." 231 All other things being
equal, it would be foolish to pass over a lawyer who had the knack of
finding a way to win in favor of one who was very experienced but had
an average record of success. As Dean Anthony Kronman lyrically ex-
plained:
The purpose of a legal education is not to produce experts,
as many nonlawyers wrongly believe. It is to train law stu-
the discredited television show, the "$64,000 Question." See id. at 100-01. Charles Revson,
the head of Revlon, was originally represented by Max Kampelinan, a politically connected
Washington lawyer, who subsequently referred Revson to Clark Clifford, another well-
connected attorney. See id, Clifford charged Revson $25,000 for only a "handful" of hours
spent on the case, achieving no particular result on Revson's behalf. See id. at 101. Accord-
ing to Lieberman, the justification for the $25,000 fee was Clifford's reputation. See LIE-
BERMAN, supra note 69, at 108. Clifford's reasoning behind the $25,000 fee for his reputa-
tion, which was, in the end, of little use to Revson, was as follows:
When ReVson gets the bill, he'll cuss and call me a son of a bitch and the
whole business. But he'll pay it. And next year, when he's down in Miami
Beach playing gin rummy with his buddies, he'll talk about his 'friend Clark
Clifford' and his 'lawyer Clark Clifford,' and how much the so-and-so charged
him—and it'll be worth $25,000 to him.
Id. (quoting GOULDEN, supra, at 101-02). Thus, apparently to some, a high fee itself em-
bodies certain value.
229 HAZARD, supra note 81, at 101.
230 See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Confessions of an Economist Killer: A Reply to Kronman's
"Lost Lawyer", 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1592, 1614 (1995) (noting that even for "tax and other
business lawyers creativity and judgment are already as important as technical skill");
James B. Loken, A Tiibute to Anne Simonett, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REP. 347, 347 (1995)
("[T] he great lawyers all have those qualities of good judgment, common sense, and what
we loosely refer to as people skills."); Irwin P. Stotzky, James Mofsky's Moral Vision, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 11, 12 (1990) (noting that the departed attorney had "the one absolutely
essential quality of a great lawyer—good judgment").
471 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 ant. (1983).
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dents, as the saying goes, to think like lawyers. . . The clever
lawyer, who possesses a huge stockpile of technical informa-
tion about the law and is adept at its manipulation, but who
lacks the ability to distinguish between what is important and
what is not and who cannot sympathetically imagine how
things look and feel from his adversary's point of view, is not
a good lawyer. He is, in fact, a rather poor lawyer who is
more likely to do his clients harm than good. The good law-
yer—the one who is really skilled at his job—is the lawyer
who possesses the full complement of emotional and percep-
tual and intellectual powers that are needed for good judg-
ment, a lawyer's most important and valuable trait. 232,
Dean Kronman's view is supported by a great deal of evidence. Many
of the best lawyers are not narrow experts specializing in repeated
treatment of routine matters, but are generalists, or have a fairly
broad specialty. For example, the Solicitor General's office is com-
posed of generalists, and every distinguished judge by necessity has
worked on a variety of subject matter areas. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, many or most lawyers who might plausibly be on a list of the
best in modern American history—Floyd Abrams, 233 Louis Bran-
deis,2" Johnnie Cochran,236 Clarence Darrow,236 John W. Davis,237 Jo-
232 Anthony T. Kronman, Chapman University School of Law Groundbreaking Ceremony, 1
CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998).
233 See, e.g., \rarity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (ERISA); Time Warner Cable v.
Bloomberg L.P., 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997) (cable television franchise contract); Tilton v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 115 F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1997) (libel); Johnson v. State, 547 So.
2d 59 (Miss. 1989) (criminal).
21 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111
(1912) (tort); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (women's wage and hour regula-
tion); Muiphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900) (criminal),
235
 See, e.g., Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1998)
(personal injury); In to Pratt, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260 (Ct. App. 1999) (criminal); Cologne v.
State Athletic Comm . '', 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300 (Ct. App. 1996) (boxing license); Cobb v.
University of S. Cal., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (Ct. App. 1995) (discrimination/breach of con-
tract).
us See, e.g., Wheeler v. Chicago & W. hid. R.R. Co., 108 N.E. 330 (111. 1915) (co-counsel
with Edgar Lee Masters in personal injury case); Western Town Lot Co. v. Pettigrew. 168
N.W. 30 (S.D. 1918) (title to land); Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927) (criminal
conviction for teaching evolution); State v. Winters, 145 A. 413 (Vt. 1929) (first degree
murder).
237 See, e.g., Brown v Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (supporting segregation in
education); Federal Power Cowmen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239 (1954)
(administrative law/water rights); Far E. Conference s United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952)
(antitrust); People v. Kressel, 277 N.Y.S. 168 (App. Div. 1935) (criminal).
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seph Floin,238 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 239 Joe Jamail,249 Arthur Liman,241
Thurgood Marshal1, 242 . Gerry Spence,243 Lawrence Tribe,244 Edward
Bennett Williams,243 Charles Alan Wright246—are or were generalists,
or had fairly broad specialties like litigation; few were specialists in
some narrow, technical field where they handled a high volume of
repetitive cases. 247 Thus, telling certain clients that their class excludes
.them from access to high-priced legal talent is not 'necessarily the
258 See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 1950) (criminal), affd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Cyanamid Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 331 F.
Supp. 597, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (breach of contract); Rushton Co. v. F.W. Woolworth, 135
F. Stipp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (copyright).
259 Although the cases that Justice Ginsburg handled in practice have an anti-sex dis-
crimination theme (if the published opinions are typical), they draw on the application of
a variety of subject matter areas. See, e.g., Calif:um v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Social
Security benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (tax); Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (antitrust).
241) See, e.g., Ferrero v. United States, 603 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1979) (personal injury);
Youngblood v. United States, 507 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (tax); Pennzoil
Co. v Texaco Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (tortious interference with con-
tract); InterFirst Bank-Houston v. Quintana Petro. Corp.. 699 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Ct.
App, 1985) (breach of fiduciary duty by trustees).
24' See, e.g., United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994) (criminal); In re
American Express Co. Shareholder Litig., 39 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 1994) (shareholder deriva-
tive action); Chase Manhattan Bank v. T&N PLC, 905 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (asbes-
tos); Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y 1994) (copy-
right).
242 See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (criminal); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (voting rights); Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Ch'. 1940) (dis-
criminatory teacher salaries); James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944) (labor).
243 see, e.g., Pickering v. USX, 801 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992) (ERISA); United States
v. Marcos, SSSS 87 CR. 598 ( JFK), 1990 WL 29368 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1990) (criminal);
Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992) (libel/First Amendment).
214 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 859 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1988) (criminal); Grendle's
Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Stipp. 761 (D. Mass. 1980) (First Amendment); American
Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997) (product liability); In re Initiative
Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992) (abortion rights).
245 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (an-
titrust); Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 836 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(FCC regulations); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (libel); United States
v. Posner, 694 F. Supp. 881 (SD, Fla. 1988) (criminal tax).
248 See, e.g., Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil, 119 S. Ct. 1563 (1999) (federal civil procedure);
Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963) (criminal); Hopwood v. Texas, 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D.
Tex. 1998) (affirmative action).
247 Of course, senior partners at elite firms may have only intermittent involvement in
cases which bear their name as counsel, but this proves the point. Because judgment may
be the most , important quality in the law, 'it may be useful to have a brilliant lawyer in-
volved, even at a high price, just for a few hours of participation in overall strategy or key
decisions. It also suggests that a lawyer with good judgment can apply it beyond a narrow
subspeciality of law.
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product of a wise and benign paternalism, preventing the poor from
frittering away their savings on trifles. Instead, it can deny them access
to some of the most sophisticated and successful practitioners.
In addition to the quality of the attorney, another major factor in
the cost of legal services is the level of effort the lawyer puts into it.
For example, even a nationally famous lawyer may be able to offer
modestly priced representation in a large and complex matter if that
lawyer's work is limited, say, to writing a letter to the adversary in an
attempt to resolve the dispute. Performing complete discovery and
taking that same case to trial might cost a hundred or a thousand
times more. While any lawyer can quickly and cheaply lose even the
most difficult case, finding a way to win a difficult case takes time,
which costs money. In Foniham, the attorneys the client first contacted
proposed to lose quickly and cheaply; the so-called "specialists" who
quoted low fees viewed the case as a loser and advised the defendant
to plead guilty. 248
 This may be a reasonable choice for some defen-
dants, but the Fordham decision means that it is the only choice.
There is another approach to litigation, one which involves leav-
ing no potentially helpful fact uninvestigated, no promising legal an-
gle unresearched. As Professor Hazard put it,
Ulf ... legal services ... are hand-tailored. to individual
situations, they will be expensive for the same reason that
surgery, portraiture, custom haberdashery, and haute cuisine
are expensive. If legal services can be purchased in a form
that is standardized, they can be made cheaper, for the same
reason that fluoride dental therapy, rack suits, and McDon-
ald's hamburgers are inexpensive. 249
An excellent lawyer spending a lot of time on a case has a better
chance of winning than a lawyer of average ability spending less time,
who in turn is likely to do better than a bargain basement lawyer try-
ing the case by the seat of the pants.25°
248
 See Brief of Respondent at 27 11.6, In re Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996) (No.
SJC 06951).
248
 HAZARD, supra note 81, at 105.
250
 The legendary Percy Foreman reportedly represented more than 1000 accused
murderers, of whom fewer than 55 spent even one day in prison. See DORMAN, supra note
215, at xi–xii. One way he achieved this record of success was through preparation.
Almost any expert questioned about Foreman invariably mentions one ele-
mentary ingredient of his style: when he enters the courtroom, he knows
more about the case than anyone else. It is this knowledge—the result of
hour upon hour of behind-the-scenes preparation—which enables Foreman
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The classic example of one model of law practice is civil practice
at elite law firms for corporate clients; able and energetic attorneys
work tirelessly to achieve the goals of their clients and are well-
compensated for their labors. An elite firm "charges top-dollar prices
to corporations for high-quality, custom service." 251 Firms engage in
"aggressive pursuit of client interests."252 In sum, "the large firm ex-
presses the attempt to combine status, expertise, and efficiency in or-
der to provide business with the highest quality legal representa-
tion."253 As a result, their clients can expect the best possible results.
By contrast, at its worst, criminal practice may offer none of these
benefits to clients. For decades, criminal defense has not been re-
garded as a prestigious or desirable practice area. 254 It also tends not
to be such a tiger at cross-examination. His quick mind helps, of course. But
far more important is his awareness of the background of every witness, every
officer, every attorney, every judge, every juror involved in the case. Such
awareness, coupled with a sixth sense that is the hallmark of every fine trial
lawyer, enables Liu to gauge almost instinctively when to hammer, when to
coddle, when to feign boredom.
Id. at 133-34. Comparefoel F. Hearing, Quality Assurance: Much More than Minimizing Mal-
practice 4, in THE QUALITY PURSUIT: ASSURING STANDARDS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Rob-
ert Michael Greene ed., 1989) ('The standard of excellence means working with each
client to create and carry out strategies for succeeding in the client's arena—not the law-
yer's.") with Maute, supra note 8, at 799 ("Lawyers who depend on high volume for routine
matters frequently run all cases through the same mill, providing minimal genuine repre-
sentation.... [T]he legal system literally disenfranchises the poor and working poor; who
must stand in line for limited patchwork representation by overworked legal services law-
yers or public defenders."), and Chan, supra note 35, at 627 ("[B]ecause the key benefit of
flat fees is 'the institution of standardized, pre-packaged groupings of cases and controver-
sies,' the grouping of cases and homogeneity of treatment will diminish the frequency of
individualized and nuanced presentations of fine legal points.") (quoting Sarah EVallS
Barker, How the Shift Front Hourly Rates Will Affect the Justice System, 77 JUDICATURE 201, 202
(1994)).
251 NELSON, supra note 227, at 214.
252
 Id. at 269.
255 1d. at 286.
254 For example, one historian reports that in -Massachusetts "as early as 1891 elite law-
yers began a headlong rush to abandon criminal practice." Alan Rogers, "A Sacred Duty"•
Court Appointed Attorneys in Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780-1980, 41 Am. J. LEGAL HIST.
440, 441 (1997); see also, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 93 (1982) (noting that criminal defense is "low pres-
tige"); Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Standard, 88
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 245 (1997) ("the professional status of the criminal lawyer
tends to be low") (citations omitted); William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of
Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 211
(1984) (working conditions and pay make'criminal practice unattractive to law students);
John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1973 and 1995, 32
LAW & S0C'Y REV. 751 (1998); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Thal as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol
in the Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal for
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to pay well. This may mean that the most promising new lawyers
choose not to go into the field; those at the low end may be "recent
law school graduates looking for experience, and ... more `experi-
enced' but marginally competent attorneys who need the income." 2"
Moreover, the circumstances of most criminal defendants do not
lend themselves to satisfying relations with their lawyers; "(ciriminal
defendants, except for the organized and white-collar crime elites,-
lack the money, status or power that makes some lawyers listen to cli-
ents."256
 That is, they are susceptible to being strong-armed by their
lawyers.257
 Accordingly, although as a technical matter blue-collar
criminal defendants are entitled to the same zealous advocacy as mob-
sters, white-collar defendants or people with large civil cases, clients
who can offer their lawyers little or nothing in the way of fees often
get what they pay for. 258
Further, Irnlost defense lawyers practice under fee arrange-
ments—a lump sum fee paid in advance, or a modest salary from a
public defender's office—that provide smaller incentives to diligence
than hourly or contingent fees."259
 One criminal lawyer reports that "a
significant percentage of cases can be successfully defended with ade-
quate effort," but that large numbers of clients may make this impos-
Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 810 (1995); Ralph Slovenko, Attitudes on Legal Representa-
tion of Accused Persons, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 101 (1964) (low pay and low prestige make crimi-
nal practice unattractive to students).
2" See Robert L. Spangenberg & N1area L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 33 (1995); see also Akhil Reed Aniar, Fourth Amend-
ment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 796 (1994) (noting that the typical criminal
defendant "rarely hires the best burr").
258
 See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RurcEns L.
REV. 101, 137 (1995). See generally Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules
Require Zealous Representation for Poor People?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 97 (1995).
257 See Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between De-
fense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 59 (1998). Professors Uphoff and Wood note that:
[MI any criminal defense lawyers still believe that as the "captain of the ship
... 'it is counsel, not defendant, who is in charge of the case.'" Most lawyers
also believe that they generally have the right to control trial tactics and strat-
egy even in the face of the defendant's contrary opinion or explicit objec-
tion."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Ann Southworth, Laller-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights
and Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL. Ernies 1101
(1996).
258 See, e.g., Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-
Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 281, 334 (1991)
("The best lawyers come at a certain price, as do the mediocre.").
259
 Leubsdorf, supra note 256, at 137.
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sible. 26° The deferential test for ineffective assistance of counsel up-
holds convictions which follow even extremely poor defense lawyer-
ing.261 As a consequence, even terrible lauyering is judicially acknowl-
edged as acceptable.
The typical criminal defendant is represented by a mediocre law-
yer, who is being paid little for the case. Because the client has no
economic leverage, the lawyer may have little reason to consult with
the client, and may be willing to spend little time designing and exe-
cuting the strategy pursuant to which the case can best be defended.
As a consequence, cases which could have been won are lost. It is hard
to blame Clark and Fisher for refusing to hire lawyers under these cir-
cumstances, instead pursuing other alternatives which, they correctly
judged, held out greater prospects for success.
Fordham was sanctioned for employing the customs of civil prac-
tice in a criminal case. He used the honorable legal techniques of
diligence and creativity, and as a result came up with a novel approach
which defeated a very strong prosecution case. In exchange for his
best efforts, he charged a substantial hourly wage. The winning legal
claim was based on nuances of OUI law, with which one might hope
OUI specialists would be familiar. Consistent with the minimalist law-
yering, however, which sometimes occurs in criminal cases, none of
the supposed specialists had even heard of the argument in the con-
text of their own practices.262 Clark correctly concluded that Ford-
ham, with absolutely no experience, was the best OUI lawyer in Bos-
ton because he was smart and would try to win the case.
TIAkcourt faulted Fordham for using an elite civil firm approach
in a criminal case, explaining: "Fordham's inexperience in criminal
defense work and OUI cases cannot justify the extraordinarily high
fee. It cannot be that an inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge
three or four times as much as an experienced lawyer for the same
senice."263 What the court failed to mention at this point was that all
250 See John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1221
(1994).
261 See, Dripps, supra note 254; William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland 's Tin
Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL or RTS.
J. 91 (1995); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 625 (1986).
2°2 See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 26 u.5, In it Fordham, 668 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1996)
(No. SJC 06951) (stating that attorney hired was only attorney consulted who recognized
and developed "novel" approach to OU1 defense).
263 Fordham, 668 N.E.2d at 822-23.
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of the OUI specialists in the case considered the case a loser.264 The
lawyers Clark consulted advised him to plead guilty. The prosecution
and defense experts at the disciplinary hearing said that if they were
handling the case, they would have charged much less, would not
have made the winning argument and would have expected to lose
the case and see Timothy Clark convicted. 265
 Since losing quickly and
cheaply was the way the lawyers Clark consulted would have chosen to
handle the case, that is what the court insisted Fordham should have
done, tinder pain of sanction.
The criminal justice system may customarily treat OUIs and other
criminal matters as routine, in Professor Anthony Alfieri's formula-
tion, as part of a "formulaic and mechanical convention devised to
process individual cases on a mass scale.”256
 But the usual 'treatment
should not mean that clients are required to accept minimally ade-
quate assistance if they have a choice.
From the client's perspective ... the matter is hardly rou-
tine. Certainly in the context of a criminal prosecution, even
at the misdemeanor level, matters should not be treated as
routine. Does the fact that a lawyer has handled twenty
worthless check misdemeanor cases one day mean that the
twenty-first is entitled to only a perfunctory handling? ...
Ulf clients are presented with the choice of having only
minimally adequate service or full service, clients will pre-
sumably choose full service. 267
The court's opinion suggested that it did not understand 49w the
process of winning works, that is, for example, the process or-Sliding
novel legal arguments. The court cited a witness who said that the to-
tal time spent on the case, up to trial, including finding and briefing
the Breathalyzer argument should have been twenty to thirty hours.
But a lawyer trying to win a case rather than just going through the
motions cannot skip straight to the winning argument. As Thomas
264 See id. at 821-22.
265 See id. The Board of Bar Overseers Hearing Committee also found that "[g]iven the
evidence against [the client], including the Breathalyzer, a two-thirds empty bottle of
Vodka and a failed sobriety test, [acquittal] was a significant result." See Petition for Certio-
rari at 55a, Fordham v. Massachusetts Bar Counsel, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997) (No. 96-946).
266 Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N3 U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 685 (1987-88); we also James E. Brill,
Frequent Flyer, 80 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 85 (noting that lawyers sometimes inappropriately
trivialize client's lives by describing legal problems as "simple" or ''routine").
267 Jacobs, supra note 256, at 101.
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Edison said, "[g]enius is one percent inspiration.and ninety-nine per-
cent perspiration"; 268 in order to find the winning point, the lawyer
must identify a number of possible issues, research each one of them
by reading cases and investigating the facts, and come to a conclusion
about which are the most promising. No lawyer in the world could
have picked up the O.J. Simpson case file, flipped through it for five
minutes, and announced "try to get Chris Darden to make him put
on the bloody gloves—that's how to win this case." That is just not
how law—or any other creative endeavor—works. Litigation associates
in large firms can bill 2500 or 3000 hours per year or more. They
work hard, for the most part, not because they are unintelligent or
want to run up the client's bill, but because they are trying to find a
'way to win. How remarkable that the Supreme Judicial Court held
that an "inexperienced" lawyer who could win is not entitled to
charge three or four times as much as "experienced" lawyers who ex-
plained from the first that they could not win, or, what the court really
held: that a blue-collar client is simply not entitled to hire a lawyer
who has the determination and ability to win a case, that they must
hire the cheaper lawyer who has promised to lose.
Disciplining excellent lawyers like Kutner and Fordham will rein-
force the status quo. In part these decisions, principal cases in several
leading texts,269 do this by sending a message that the criminal prob-
lems of ordinary people are unworthy of the attention of elite practi-
tioners. More importantly, good-faith fees in other practice areas are
not regulated through discipline as in the criminal area. In other ar-
eas, fees and standards are permitted to change over time. It may be,
for example, that changes in tax law, family law and available legal
vehicles mean that competent preparation of an estate plan for a fam-
ily in 1999 will be much more complicated, and much more expen-
sive, than would comparable advice in 1979. Practitioners in that field
268 Thomas Alva Edison, quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 555 ( Justin Kap-
lan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
269 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 490-99
(3d ed. 1999) (exceipting and discussing Fan/ham); JAMES E, MOLITERNO, CASES AND MA-
TERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 136 (2000) (excerpting and discussing Kutner);
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 686-93 (2d ed. 1995) (excerpting and
discussing Kutner); JOHN F. SUTTON & JOHN S. DZIENEOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAWYERS 371-74 (1989) (excerpting Kutner); see
also GILLERS, supra note 116, at 138-39 (discussing Fordham); THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY'. PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 141 (7th
ed. 2000) (discussing Fordham); MAYNARD E. PIRSIG & KENNETH F. KIRWIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 44211.13 (4th ed. 1984) (citing Kutner).
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who offer more, do more, and charge more have no reason to fear dis-
cipline. Cases like Ford ham help ensure that fees in criminal cases stay
low, and that the minimalist customs of criminal representation do
not change. An attorney who goes beyond bare-bones lawyering in a
criminal case risks sanctions. This cannot be the intent of a set of
rules designed to guide the ethical behavior of lawyers.2"
Attorneys who know that they will be precluded from receiving
adequate compensation may refrain from undertaking criminal cases,
and, "[o}ver the long haul, the result of lowered compensation levels
will be that talented attorneys will 'decline to enter criminal prac-
tice. . . . This exodus of talented attorneys could devastate the crimi-
nal defense bar.'"271
 Moreover,
Wile right to privately chosen and compensated counsel
also serves broader institutional interests. "The virtual so-
cialization of criminal defense work in this country" that
would be the result of a widespread abandonment of the
right to retain chosen counsel . . . too readily would stan-
dardize the provision of criminal-defense services and dimin-
2" The preambles to both the Model Code and the Model Rules set out the overall objec-
tives and design of each code. The Model Code urges that
[w]ithin the framework of [fundamental ethical] principles, a lawyer must
with coinage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of the law to
the ever-changing relationships of society Each lawyer must find within
his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which
his actions should rise above minimum standards.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1980) (endnote omitted) (cit-
ing Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer
and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 440 (1965)). The Model Rules provide that
ia]s a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession." MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). Moreover, the preamble to the Model Rules states
that "[a] lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the
legal profession." Id. Under the reasoning of the Fordham court, the goals of the Model Code
and Model Rules as outlined in their respective preambles are clearly compromised by, in
effect, prompting individuals to forgo "blue chip" representation in favor of bare-bones
attorneys.
271 Caplitt & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 646-47 (1989) (Slaclunun, J., dis-
senting) (citation omitted). In Cap/in & Thysdale, Justice Blackmun noted that "even the
best intentioned of attorneys may have no choice but to decline the task of representing
defendants in cases for which they will not receive adequate compensation." See id. at 647;
cf. In re Kindhart, 160 F.3d 1176, 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1998) (characterizing sufficiency of
bankruptcy fees as "au important matter not only to attorneys, but to the courts and the
public," and reversing low fee award because "the consequences of continued unreasona-
bly low fees might affect the rendering of prompt and good legal services").
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ish defense counsel's independence. There is a place in our
system of criminal justice for the maverick and the risk taker
and for approaches that might not fit into the structured en-
vironment of a public defender's office, or that might dis-
please a judge whose preference for nonconfrontational
styles of advocacy might influence the judge's appointment
decisions.... There is also a place for the employment of
"specialized defense counsel" for technical or complex
cases. . . . The choice of counsel is the primary means for the
defendant to establish the kind of defense he will put for-
ward.272
The low quality of counsel and low fees will reinforce each other. As
good lawyers disdain criminal practice, the average low quality may
lead courts and legislatures to believe that defense lawyers deserve at
most low fees. As criminal defense lawyers receive low fees, future law-
yers will have even less incentive to enter the area. These unfortunate
circumstances may not entirely be the fault of the Illinois and Massa-
chusetts supreme courts, but there is no reason that courts should
embrace them as positive law.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RETAIN COUNSEL OF CHOICE
The Illinois and Massachusetts supreme courts have explained to
blue-collar criminal defendants that they may not "bid against other
[clients] for the services of the ablest and most experienced attorneys,
whose expertise may make the difference between success and fail-,
ure";273 instead, such defendants are required to hire bargain base-
ment lawyers even if they want and can manage to pay more expensive
ones, and even if the lack of expert counsel means they will be con-
victed of crimes. It is ironic that the leading decisions on unreason-
able fees are criminal cases, because depriving defendants of counsel
of choice in this particular context is not just unwise and unfair, it is
unconstitutional.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[On all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."274 This clause is commonly associated with
the interpretation guaranteeing indigent defendants the right to ap-
472 CaPfill &Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 647 (Blackniun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
2" See In re Boston & Maine Corp., 778 F.2d 890, 898 (1st Cir. 1985) (Campbell, C.f.,
joined by Breyer & Rubin, B.) (citations omitted).
474 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
58	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 41:1
pointed counsel, recognized in capital cases by the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama. 275
 Although there exists
"neither in the Congress which proposed what became the Sixth
Amendment guarantee . . . nor in the state ratifying conventions .. .
any indication of the understanding associated with the language em-
ployed," it is apparent that the original guarantee was aimed at "assur-
ing that a person wishing and able to afford counsel would not be de-
nied that right."276
 Indeed, "[t] here is considerable doubt that the
Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the
Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an
accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a law-
yer to assist in his defense."277
 The Sixth Amendment was intended to
end the English judicial practice of refusing "to permit prisoners in
felony cases to obtain the assistance of counsel, retained counsel cer-
tainly included."278
275
 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court in Powell set aside the convictions of eight African-
American youths who were sentenced to death for rape in a case that quickly went to trial
without the benefit of counsel and ordered the state to appoint counsel on retrial because
the youths were unable to afford counsel. See id. at 49-50, 71. Although the case was pivotal
in expanding the scope of the Sixth Amendment to apply to indigent criminal defendants,
the holding of the case was narrow: a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of igno-
rance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether re-
quested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law...."
Id. at 71. Ten years after Powell, in Betts tt Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court limited its
application in state trials to cases in which the denial of appointed counsel denied funda-
mental fairness. In contrast, Johnson u Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), required the federal
courts to routinely appoint counsel in felony cases. In 1963, the Court, in Gideon u Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), overruled Betts, holding that the right to appointed counsel
existed in every felony case in which the defendant could not afford counsel. Then, in
1972, in Argersinger u Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), the Court further clarified the right to
appointed counsel to apply to any criminal charge, including misdemeanors, in which a
prison term could be imposed.
176
 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1399 (Johnny H. Killian
& George A. Costello eds., 1996); see also, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-33, 89-90 (1955) (discussing history of right to counsel);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
RIGHT OF THE PERSON 107-08 (1968) (same),
2" Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (citing BEANEY, supra note 276, at 27-30).
275 WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 791; see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra
note 276, at 1399 ("Rifle development of the common-law principle in England had de-
nied to anyone charged with a felony the right to retain counsel"). The reason for the
harsh English policy "seems to have been general hostility against defendants and, per-
haps, sonic concern that pettifoggery of lawyers would needlessly confound matters."
WOLFRAM, supra fLote 19, at 791.
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The Supreme Court has recognized the right to hire counsel in
several key decisions. In Powell, the Court noted that "[i] t is hardly
necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defen-
dant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his
own choice. "2''° Similarly, in Chandler u Fretag, the Court acknowl-
edged the "well established" distinction between the right to ap-
pointed counsel and the right to obtain one's own counse1.28° The
Court determined that, upon a criminal defendant's request for a
continuance to obtain counsel, "[Regardless of whether petitioner
would have been entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to
be heard through his own counsel was unqualified:181
More recent cases also make clear that defendants have a Sixth
Amendment interest in hiring counsel of their choice. 282 In 1988, in
Wheat v. United States, the Court recognized that "the right to select
and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by
the Sixth Amendment."283 To be sure, the Court held that hi some
circumstances, a defendant could be denied the right to be repre-
sented by the desired counse1. 284 The Court reasoned that the pur-
pose of the guarantee of assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial
and the focus of the inquiry is on the adversarial process, not neces-
sarily on the accused's relationship with his lawyer.285 The Court noted
that:
The Sixth Amendment right to choose one's own counsel is
circumscribed in several important respects. Regardless of
his persuasive powers, an advocate who is not a member of
the bar may not represent clients . . . in court. Similarly, a de-
fendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he
cannot afford or who for other reasons declines to represent
the defendant. Nor may a defendant insist on the counsel of
an attorney who has a previous or ongoing relationship with
an opposing party .286
279 287 U.S. at 53.
280 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
281 Id.
282 See generally Eugene L. Shapiro, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choke: An Ex-
ercise in the Weighing of Unarticulated Values, 43 S.C. L. REv. 345 (1992).
283 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)
284 Sec id.
285
 See id.
286 Id.	 •
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Thus, the Court concluded that a criminal defendant did not have a
Sixth Amendment right to employ counsel with a conflict of interest,
even if the client was willing to waive the conflict for purposes of the
case.287
Another recent case, Caplin Drysdale v. United States, 288
 strongly
suggests that fee limits are unconstitutional. The case addressed
whether the Sixth Amendment prevented the government from for-
feiting a defendant's assets, thereby depriving him of the ability to se-
cure counsel of choice. 2" Throughout the litigation, all of the courts
seemed to assume that defendants could spend their own funds for
their defense.299
 A panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
plained that there is a
right—concededly qualified—to counsel of one's choice.
This means, in general, a right to retain private counsel of
one's choice out of one's private resources, and up to the
limit of those resources, free of government interference.
Thus, while it has presumably never been attempted, it
seems clear that any legislative attempt by general rule di-
rectly to put a cap on what persons accused of crimes could
pay privately retained defense counsel, or to dictate the
choice of private counsel by special qualification, or however,
would be unconstitutional. 291
The Fourth Circuit en bane concluded that asset forfeiture did
not violate the Sixth Amendment, but agreed with the panel that the
right to counsel included the right to spend one's own money to hire
counsel of choice. 292
 The Fourth Circuit noted that:
As stated by the ... panel opinion, [the right to counsel]
"means, in general, a right to retain private counsel out of
one's private resources, free of government interference." ...
The government could not, for example, simply restrain
297 See id. at 156-57. The Supreme Court in Wheat determined that any "presumption
in favor of [a criminal defendant's] counsel of choice" may be overcome upon demonstra-
tion of actual or serious potential conflict of the attorney. See id. at 164.
288
 491 U.S. 617 (1989), affg In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Char-
tered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), reh'g United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905
(4th Cir. 1987).
289
 See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
290 See id. at 621-22.
291 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 923 (citations omitted).
292 See Forfeiture, 837 F.2d at 644.
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funds to which it claims no legal entitlement so as to force a
defendant to accept appointed counse1. 293
The court recognized that preventing defendants from spending
their own funds on counsel would implicate the Sixth Amendment,
even if defendants could constitutionally be prevented from spending
money which belonged to someone else. 294 Thus, the court en bane
agreed with the panel that defendants had the right to spend their
own money on a defense in a criminal case without limit. 295
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the en bane court,
in an opinion which seemed to accept the proposition that defen-
dants have the right to spend their own money for counse1. 296 The
Court noted that the government did not "deny that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an
otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire,
or who is willing to represent the defendant even though he is with-
out funds" and emphasized that "[t]he forfeiture statute does not
prevent a defendant who has nonforfeitable assets from retaining any
attorney of his choosing."297 In holding that asset forfeiture did not
implicate the Sixth Amendment, the Court explained "[w]hatever the
full extent of the Sixth Amendment's protection of one's right to re-
tain counsel of his choosing, that protection does not go beyond 'the
individual's right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and
293 See id. (citing Harvey, 814 F.2d at 923 and United States ex rel. Ferenc v. Brierly, 320
F. Stipp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1970)).
See id. at 649-45. The court explained:
For this reason, fee forfeiture is not as the ... panel has suggested, the con-
stitutional equivalent of a government-imposed cap on spending for defense
counsel or a law requiring those charged with certain crimes to rely on ap-
pointed counsel. In these situations, the government attempts to restrict the
defendant's use of his own undisputed assets .... Those with their own funds
must be given the fair opportunity to secure counsel up to the limit of their
funds; those without assets of their own must be satisfied with appointed
counsel, over whose selection they may have little influence.
Id.
295 See id. at 649.
296 See Capin Drysdak 491 U.S. at 624-25.
297 Id. Of course, ethical fee limitations do not dimrtly deprive clients of counsel. Law-
yers whose skills and reputations allow them to command fees which would exceed the fee
cap can simply reduce their rates or work for free. (They may be willing to do so for rich
clients who provide other, more lucrative engagements.) Alternatively, high-cost lawyers
could simply do a less thorough job. For practical purposes, however, fee caps prevent
people from hiring counsel of their choice, as the Cap/in &Thysdate Court acknowledged
when it recognized third-party standing on the part of the law firm. See id at 62311.3.
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assistance of . : . counsel.'"299
 Many other cases suggest that defen-
dants have the right to spend their own money on counsel.299
In short, the California Supreme Court seems to have correctly
stated the law when it explained:
The state should keep to a necessary minimum its interfer-
ence with the individual's desire to defend himself in what-
ever manner he deems best, using any legitimate means
within his resources and that desire can constitutionally be
forced to yield only when it will result in significant preju-
dice to the defendant himself or in a disruption of the or-
derly processes of justice unreasonable under the circum-
stances of the particular case. 300
Absent some legitimate purpose that would be served by disqualifying
a particular lawyer from participating in a particular case, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to retain
counsel of choice. 301
 The situations in which the courts have limited
298 Id. at 626 (citing Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370
(1985)).
299
 See, e.g., Haynie v. Furlong, 172 F.3c1 62, 1999 WI.. 80144, at *2 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is generally cognizable only
to the extent defendant can retain counsel with private funds") (citing United States v.
Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1014 S.:11.12 (10th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Jones, 160
F.3d 641, 646-47 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that due process grants defendants a post-
restraint healing in some circumstances when the government seizes assets needed to re-
tain counsel); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973) ('The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel includes ... the right of any accused, if he can provide coun-
sel for himself by his own resources or through the aid of his family or friends, to be repre-
sented by an attorney of his choosing."); United States v. Najjar, 57 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209
(D. Md. 1999) (holding that pretrial restraint of property which was not in fact subject to
forfeiture violated the Sixth Amendment); English v. State, 259 A.2d 822, 825 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1969) ("[Wpien an accused has the means to employ counsel, he should be
afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.") (citations omitted);
State v. Buffalo Chief, 155 N.W.2d 914, 918 11.3 (S.D. 1968) ("A defendant with means has
the right to be represented by a lawyer of his own choice.") (citations omitted).
300
 People v. Holland, 588 P.2d 765, 770 (Cal. 1978) (quoting People v. Crovedi, 417
P.2d 868, 874 (Cal. 1966)).
30 i See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing the import of the constitutional guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel of
choice). Some commentators have criticized the current practice of denying an indigent
the right to use the funds allocated for his defense to retain counsel of choice. See, e.g.,
Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Do Reim-
bursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent T, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 181, 181 (1998); Peter W. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27
STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974).
A possible exception is the well established rule against contingent fees in criminal
cases, which has been trenchantly criticized. Sec Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and
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counsel of choice involved efforts to ensure that defendants receive
qualified counsel, not to deprive them of it, or to ensure that meas-
ures necessary to protect the orderly decisionmaking process exist,
such as denying continuances." There is no justification for denying
a defendant the ability to employ retained, licensed, conflict-free and
available counsel, simply because the lawyer is skilled enough to
command a high wage."
Finally, if fee limitations are consistent with the Sixth Amend-
ment,  that would mean that the rich have a greater right to counsel
than the poor.304 It is unfortunate that this situation is true as a practi-
cal matter, but if the fee cap cases are correct and the ethical codes
are a filter through which the Sixth Amendment must be read, then
favoritism for the rich becomes a matter of positive law. If the ethical
Criminal Cases, 93 COMM. L. REV. 595 (1993). Assuming that this rule would be upheld by
the Supreme Court, as Professor Harlan explains, it arguably rests on some of the same
considerations as Wheat. See id. at 600. It is true that denying defendants the right to retain
counsel On a contingent fee may limit their ability to retain counsel of their choice. See id.
at 605. Some lawyers might agree to take a case on a very large contingent fee who would
not take the same case on an hourly basis. A contingent fee, however, in a criminal case is
less likely to be attractive to lawyers or clients because usually no pot of money is created if
the contingency comes through. See id. at 602-03. Thus, in the criminal context unlike the
civil, a poor client generally cannot use the contingency structure to interest a lawyer who
would otherwise decline the business. See id. Moreover, if a client can actually pay a contin-
gent fee, they can likely pay a substantial hourly wage. Leaving these practicalities aside, a
court might reason that contingent fees should be prohibited for the benefit of clients. A
lawyer working on a contingent fee might be disinclined to consider a guilty plea to a re-
duced charge, or to do more than minimal work on the case if it turns out to be a prob-
able loser. See id. at 631-32. Under these perfectly foreseeable circumstances, a contingent
fee would disadvantage the client.
"2 "An accused is not entitled to impose on legitimate interests of the prosecution and
the judicial system in order to obtain last-minute continuances to accommodate the
schedule of private counsel or to permit a dilatory accused to obtain private assistance for
the first time." WOLFRAM, supra note 19, at 802.
"2 There may be arguments for limiting defendants from spending their own money
which rest on rejection of the role of partisan lawyers in the adversary system, rejection of
the adversary system as a whole or concerns about the undue influence of wealth on the
justice system. Whatever the merits or lack thereof of these critiques, they are beyond the
scope of this Article, as at the moment the United States has an adversary system driven in
large part by hired counsel.
"4 See Morris, 461 U.S. at 21-22 (Brennan, J., concurring). Further, if the concern of
the Sixth Amendment is fairness and accuracy, there is no reason to impose fee caps, be-
cause fee caps will apply only on one side. Prosecutors are generally attorneys, and thus
subject to ethical rules, but they generally do not receive fees based on each case. Accord-
ingly. they are unlikely to face the question of unreasonable fees. They do have choices,
however, abottt the resources to invest into any given case. Although prosecutors have in-
centives to use care with their limited resources, they never need to worry that spending
too much time on a case, or putting their best efforts into it, will be met with discipline.
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codes are a filter, a rich person can hire Roy Black on an OUI case,
because the factors of "importance" and "ability to pay" will justify a
higher fee. If all other facts, however, are the same except that the
defendant is a middle- or working-class person who mortgages their
home or signs a note to hire Roy Black, Roy Black has to say no, be-
cause of the risk of being found guilty of an ethical violation for ac-
cepting a large fee from such a person. The state, which is trying to
brand one of its people as a criminal, has no business instructing
them not to fight back too hard, to say "your life, your freedom or
your reputation are unworthy of the best defense you can mount."
In 1985, in Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 305
the Supreme Court held that Congress could constitutionally restrict
attorneys' fees in connection with application for certain veteran's
benefits to ten dollars. At first blush, Miters seems to support the no-
tion that the right to pay a fee may constitutionally be restricted; the
Court's reasoning, however, in fact suggests that fee limitations in the
criminal context would be unconstitutional.306 A majority of the Court
determined that the fee limitation did not violate the Due Process
Clause because higher fees would frustrate the congressional goal of
ensuring that veterans received the bulk of the awards, and would
complicate a process intended to be informal and nonadversarial. 507
Justice Stevens powerfully argued in dissent that an "individual's
right to spend his own money to obtain the advice and assistance of
independent counsel," at least in disputes with the Government, is
protected by the Due Process Clause. 308
 But whether Walters is correct,
the Court recognized that its reasoning would not apply in the crimi-
nal context, because "no one would gainsay that criminal proceedings
"5 See 473 U.S. 305,308 (1985).
" See id. at 332-34.
307
 See id. at 323-26.
" See id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens,
[i[f the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in protecting the
citizen from his own improvidence, can deny hint access to independent
counsel of his choice, it can change the character of our free society. Even
though a dispute with the sovereign may only involve property rights, or as in
this case a statutory entitlement, the citizen's right of access to the independ-
ent, private bar is itself an aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in our
democracy.
Id. at 370-71 (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens also asserted that "[elvery citizen in this
country is presumed to be unrestricted in consulting or employing an attorney on any
matter, or in making a decision that legal representation for any purpose is not needed."
Id. at 371 n.22.
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are adversarial in nature." 3°9 The Court took pains to distinguish cases
decided under the Sixth Amendment. 31° Moreover, the majority in
Walters concluded that the right to counsel could lawfully be restricted
in the veteran's benefits context; this determination was necessary
only because the Court recognized that a fee cap was a material in-
fringement on the ability to obtain counse1. 311 Because the Court in
Walters recognized that a fee cap constitutes an interference with
counsel, it supports the idea that caps will be impermissible in a situa-
tion where the right to counsel exists with full force. 312
One commentator has questioned the right to counsel of choice,
suggesting that tactical use of disqualification motions and of asset
forfeiture, done with the purpose of "disrupting" the relationship be-
tween attorney and client was not found by the Court to be "antitheti-
cal to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 313 Although the Court
upheld the particular actions at issue in those cases, it did not so
completely undermine the right to counsel of choice that the opin-
ions recognize. 314 The decisions in Wheat and Cap/in & Drysdale sug-
gest that manipulation of forfeiture and disqualification for tactical
advantage could be improper." 5 In Wheat, the Court explained:
[P]etitioner of course rightly points out that the Govern-
ment may seek to "manufacture" a conflict in order to pre-
vent a defendant from having a particularly able defense
counsel at his side; but trial courts are undoubtedly aware of
this possibility, and must take it into consideration along
with all of the other factors which inform this sort of a deci-
sion."6
Similarly, in Cap/in &Drysdale, the Court acknowledged the possibility
of forfeiture actions aimed at interfering with counsel, but said
"[c] ases involving particular abuses can be dealt with individually by
the lower courts, when (and if) any such cases arise." 317
366 1d. at 332.
316 See Walters, 473 U.S. at 332.
311 See id. at 333.
312 Sec id.
313 Leroy D. Clark, All Defendants, Rich and Pow; Should Get Appointed Counsel in Criminal
Cases: The Route to True Equal Justice, 81 51ARQ. L. RES'. 47, 66 (1997).
514 See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 635; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
315 See Caplin & Thysdale, 491 U.S. at 635; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
316 Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163.
317 CaPlin &Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 635.
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IV. TOWARD A DISCLOSURE STANDARD
A client facing criminal charges or other legal difficulties he or
she deems serious should be free to pay his or her lawyer, from his or
her own funds, whatever fees he or she chooses, even in situations
where a given disciplinary board might feel the life, liberty or prop-
erty at stake is worth less than the fee involved. But the principle of
client choice or freedom of contract in general does not mean that
the area should be entirely unregulated. A free market has many ad-
vantages, but so do certain checks on the market, such as requiring
training and licensing of those who would practice law, and protecting
unsophisticated clients from overreaching attorneys. 318
The rationale for the reasonable fee regulation is really to ensure
that clients understand their choices before they make them and that
clients buy the services they need, but no more.319
 The ethical rules
do not carry out this purpose well. Timothy Clark may have reason to
complain about the financial arrangements between him and his law-
yer, because it may well be that he did not give informed consent in
the full sense of the term to the fee arrangement. 32° Fordham, how-
ever, violated no rules regarding client communication. The Model
Rules requires certain disclosures to the client. Model Rule 1.5(b)
provides that "[w]hen a lawyer has not regularly represented the cli-
ent, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client,
preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after corn-
318 But see Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Contract
Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility Considerations in the Attorney-Client
Relationship, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791, 815 (1991) (arguing for more of a free-market
approach to fee contracts and questioning "why a lawyer, acting without deceit, without
coercion, and without any other form of untoward conduct is not free to price his legal
services at what a client is willing to pay, reasonable or otherwise").
319
 This Article does not mean to enter into the debate about the possibility of achiev-
ing true informed consent in every case through the mechanism of rules and it is no
doubt true that inequalities in knowledge and power will make it more difficult for many
clients to exercise unconstrained choice. Recognizing the problematic nature of truly in-
formed consent by clients, however, given the inevitability of attorney-client fee negotia-
tions and agreements, this Article suggests an approach which, if it works, will leave the
fewest clients surprised. If this approach is the best that can be done, or even is better than
the current system, then the fact that it is imperfect is no reason not to consider it.
320
 One article suggested that the failure to communicate was Fordham's true error in
the case. See Christine S. Filip & Ann E. Johnston, Misleading Message May Spark Suit, 146
Prrrsintimx LEGAL J. 25, 26 (1998) ("While Fordham is not usually cited as a faillure-to-
communicate case, the issue of effective connnunication concerning the fee structure is
implicit and instructive.").
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mencing the representation";321 under the Model Code, a similar re-
quirement was merely a suggestion.522 At or near the beginning of the
representation, Fordham did explain to the client the basis or rate of
the fee—au hourly rate of $200 per hour.
Althotigh Fordham did everything the rules required, in retro-
spect, Clark might have expected more. Fordham, for his part, might
wish that he had offered a description of the available alternative
strategies, their advantages and disadvantages, and offered some idea
about what the various approaches would cost before he chose one or
decided to approach another attorney. 323 Informed agreement must
take into account the knowledge and experience of the client. There-
fore, although Clark had a sense of what other attorneys might charge
for the representation, Fordham would be required to explain to a
less sophisticated client that choosing him would be more expensive.
On the other hand, once a formerly unsophisticated client has be-
come sophisticated through consultation with counsel, there is no
reason not to honor client decisions about the representation.
Achieving informed agreement would not require a great deal
more than the communication and disclosure that the rules already
require, only earlier, and with price tags attached. Under the current
rules, lawyers are required to "abide by a client's decisions concerning
the objectives of representation. "524 The rules provide that "[al lawyer
may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents
after consultation."525 Accordingly, under existing law, the client de-
cides what the goal of the case will be. The client also already holds
the purse strings; lawyers "should defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third per-
sons who might be adversely affected."326 Finally, the lawyer is already
obligated to think about the case and consult with the client about
how it will be handled. The lawyer must "explain a matter to the ex-
321 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b) (1983); see also id. Rule
1.4(a) ("A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."); id. Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make in-
formed decisions regarding the representation.").
322 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19 (1980).
325 See POONBERG, SUM note 225, at 66 (asserting that, in hiring attorneys, "Marge
corporations often expect even more than a 'consultation.' They will often ask competing
law firms to submit strategies and budgets for handling a particular matter").
324 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
325 Id. Rule 1.2(c).
326 Id. Rule 1.2(c) cult.
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tent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions."327
 If the substance of the conversation occurs at the beginning
of the representation and the lawyer offers some kind of reasonable
estimate of the price of each option, the client will have an informed
basis upon which to proceed. In addition, a lawyer must "keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter,"328
 which could
comfortably be read to require a lawyer to report material changes in
an estimate.
One malpractice treatise recommends that attorneys engage in
detailed fee discussions with prospective clients, 329 and that the
agreements be reduced to writing. 339
 If shrewd attorneys will have this
discussion in order to protect themselves from fee disputes and mal-
practice claims, there is no reason not to expect ethical attorneys to
have this discussion for the benefit of their clients.
One possible rule would look like this:
Proposed Model RUle 1.5(a). A lawyer shall not:
(1) Charge or collect a fee which is prohibited by law;
(2) Charge or collect a fee without permission of any court
or other authority from whom permission is required by law,
or in an amount that is more than authorized by the court or
other authority;
(3) Charge a fee which exceeds or is otherwise in material
breach of the fee agreement with the client; and
(4) Charge or collect a fee without reasonable consultation
with the client at the beginning of the representation and
527 Id. Rule 1.4(b).
528 See id. Rule 1.4(a); see also In re Dorothy, 605 N.W.2d 493, 501 (S.D. 2000) (reading
MR 1.4 as potentially applicable to billing matters).
522 See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.15, at 123
(3d ed. 1989). Although the treatise noted that estimating fees is difficult, it suggested that
it was in lawyers' best interest to discuss costs anyway, because it could lead to greater net
collections. The treatise stated that
if the original estimates are conveyed properly and updated with some fre-
quency, both the law firm and clients will benefit. Again, any client concerned
about paying the fees and expenses will appreciate the effort spent in provid-
ing such estimates Given the amount of write-downs and write-offs which
most firms experience, effectively discussing fees and expenses and providing
frequent updates will probably improve law firm profitability.
Id.
s3° See id. § 2.16, at 127; see also generally Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need For a
Mandatory IViitten Fee Agreement Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1998) {making the argument,
indisputably correct, that all fee agreements should be in writing).
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within a reasonable time after any material change. Consul-
tation shall include the amount of the fee if it is fixed, or the
manner in which it will be calculated if it is not; the alterna-
tive means by which the matter could be handled; the risks
and benefits of the alternatives; general estimates as to the
costs of the alternatives; and any other matter which, under
the circumstances, is reasonably necessary to permit the cli-
ent to make an informed decision. If the fee is not fixed, the
lawyer shall make clear that any general estimates are non-
binding and subject to revision.
(5) This rule does not Modify any authority granted courts
by law to regulate fee agreements and fee awards.
Sections one through three of this proposed Model Rule restate
existing law."1 The final sentence makes clear that the rule does not
repeal the judiciary's traditional authority to reduce attorney's fees in
cases where circumstances make strict enforcement unfair, but where
discipline is not warranted. Section four is the heart of the proposal.
The first paragraph invokes the concept of consultation, which is al-
ready defined by the current Model Rules as "communication of in-
formation reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question.'w2 Section four essentially asks
lawyers to attach a price tag to advice they are already required to
give.333
Jurisdictions should consider, effectuating the goal of informing
clients with even more powerful prophylactics, such as requiring law-
yers to advise clients that it is generally prudent to speak with more
than one lawyer, just as doctors urge patients to seek a second Opinion
before making a major decision. There is even precedent in the rules
for requiring lawyers to advise clients to seek representation before
entering into a transaction with a client; perhaps agreements to large
fees should be negotiated by independent counse1.534 Although no
business is eager to tell potential customers to think about taking
their patronage elsewhere, there is no reason not to expect attorneys
to take reasonable steps to prevent clients and potential clients from
331 See, e.g., MODEL conE or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983).
332 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983).
333 The purpose of the rule is to provide more information to clients, not impose all
risk of uncertainty on the attorney. Therefore, it is not necessary that the estimates be
binding on the attorney.
”4 Thanks to William Becker for this suggestion.
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making unwise decisions because of their inexperience with legal mat-
ters. Moreover, these steps will protect the agreements that result be-
cause it will suggest that they were made knowingly.
CONCLUSION
The proposed reform will not take money out of clients' pockets;
there is no suggestion that the traditional power to cut fees without
imposing discipline be eliminated. Courts would retain their current
power to reform attorney-client contracts. Rather, what would be lost
is the formal disciplinary rule, the black letter principle that attor-
neys' fees be "reasonable." Critics of the profession might point to
such a change and say: "I told you so. There is not even a pretense,
lawyers don't even claim their fees should be reasonable." If abandon-
ing the reasonable fee rules is problematic from a public relations
perspective, it holds the promise of substantive benefits for clients.
Although nothing proposed here will eliminate entirely the frustra-
tion some clients have with the legal system or client surprise at bills,
it may help. More information will cut off disputes before they hap-
pen by helping to ensure that clients hire lawyers with their eyes open,
and make better choices about their cases. The profession should be
willing to acknowledge the truth about the weakness of the reason-
able fee rules and reform them for the benefit of clients.
